Decision-support tool Comparison

Electric and combustion vehicles

This interactive tool lets you see and compare the ecological, social and financial impacts of electric and combustion vehicles.


The verdict

Over its full lifetime, the electric vehicle (EV) is the better choice:

Ecologically, widening the view to the ecological and societal themes, the EV exerts less pressure than the combustion vehicle, taking the whole life cycle into account.

Financially, the electric vehicle is clearly ahead. The higher purchase price is recovered through fuel and maintenance savings well before the end of the vehicle's life. The cost calculator says at which kilometre.

Societally, the electric vehicle improves public health, the trade balance and society's resilience to oil from elsewhere.

Note: the best ecological choice remains not buying a vehicle at all. See question 10: Am I an environmentalist if I drive electric?

Quebec scenarios

Everything below recalculates from your assumptions. Set them yourself: mileage, battery chemistry, grid intensity, crude origin, and more.

Wallet

Lifetime savings
CAD

Environment

Societal and ecological pressure
out of 5
GHG emissions
× less
Greenhouse gases (GHG): electric against gasoline vehicle, over the whole life of the vehicle and counting every supply chain.
Manufacturing debt cleared
km
The one serious objection to the electric vehicle. It is real, and it is settled early in the vehicle's life.

Societal

Social cost avoided
CAD
Climate damages spared, priced at the carbon price set in the settings.
You have the essentials. What follows, section by section
  1. Impacts: ten ecological and social themes scored from 1 to 5, seven of them set by Pareto, and the rule behind each score.
  2. The climate in detail: the two starting debts, what is paid before the first kilometre, then the two lifetime balances.
  3. Charts: where the carbon goes, and from which kilometre on the electric vehicle pulls ahead.
  4. Wallet: your cost over the life of the vehicle, at the prices you enter.
  5. Settings: three sliders in the open, twelve more behind a fold, and the calculation method.
  6. Frequently asked questions: ten common objections, the tenth being the one the verdict points to.
  7. Beyond the vehicle, outside the calculation: what the ministry puts a figure on for the weakened ZEV standard, six public policy measures, what pushes and what holds back, what each travel mode costs. These are positions held by Pareto, backed by sources, not outputs of the tool.
  8. Sources: 227 references, each annotated.
Glossary
GHG
Greenhouse gases: everything that warms, from CO₂ to methane, expressed in CO₂ equivalent.
t CO₂e
Tonne of CO₂ equivalent, the unit that adds up greenhouse gases by their warming power.
Manufacturing debt
The emissions paid before the first kilometre, battery, vehicle and infrastructure included; it clears as the vehicle drives more cleanly than the other.
Break-even kilometre
The mileage from which the electric vehicle has made up its manufacturing debt and pulls ahead.
Life-cycle assessment
The balance sheet of a product from extraction to end of life, not at the tailpipe only; LCA for short.
LFP
Lithium iron phosphate battery, with neither cobalt nor nickel; the chemistry of the Car and SUV archetypes.
NMC 811
Nickel-manganese-cobalt battery, denser in energy; the chemistry of the pickup truck.
Grid carbon intensity
The grams of CO₂e emitted to produce one kilowatt-hour: 34.5 g in Quebec over the life cycle, 473 g for the world average.
Social cost of carbon
The damage, in dollars, caused by one more tonne of CO₂; $275 a tonne by default, the federal value for 2026.
Type-approval rating
The consumption measured on a standardized test cycle, which real driving exceeds.
Plug-in hybrid
A vehicle with two powertrains, running on electricity for its first kilometres and then on gasoline.
ZEV standard
The zero-emission vehicle standard, which requires each manufacturer to bring a growing share of electric vehicles to market.

Social and ecological impacts committed by one vehicle

Ten themes scored from 1 to 5: the compared profile, the detail of each theme and the rule behind each score.
What these ten themes coverthree scores calculated, seven set by Pareto

The impact of a vehicle and of its energy source reaches well beyond greenhouse gases: it also commits water, metals, land, marine ecosystems, human health and democratic institutions. Here are ten themes, scored from 1 (low pressure) to 5 (high pressure). Three of these scores are calculated from the settings; the other seven are set by Pareto, under the rule set out in How the ten themes are scored. Their categories draw on those used in the work cited in the references, in frameworks such as IMPACT World+ and social life-cycle assessment, and in the divergences catalogued by TranSensus LCA. We have added two blind spots of the life-cycle assessment literature: democratic health and societal robustness.

The ten themes side by side

Electric vehicle Gasoline vehicle Greyed axis: theme ignored

Each axis is a theme, scored from 1 at the centre to 5 at the edge: the wider the shape, the stronger the ecological and social pressure, and the green shape, the electric vehicle, should stay inside the orange one. The axes respond to the settings and to the weights you choose in the table that unfolds just below. One caveat: the area of such a chart depends on the order of the axes, which is arbitrary; read it axis by axis, not as an overall measure, and the combined score in the table remains the only aggregate.

The ten themes in detailEach theme's score, what it covers, and the weight you give it in the combined score.

Each theme unfolds in turn: what is measured, which side the pressure falls on, and the sources.

ThemeElectric vehicle · Electricity chainGasoline vehicle · Oil chain
How the ten themes are scoredThe rule behind each score, what moves it, and what is calculation and what is judgement.

Each theme receives two scores from 1 to 5, one per vehicle: 1 for low pressure, 5 for high pressure. The colour follows the score, green below 2.5, yellow below 3.5, red above. Three themes are calculated from a physical quantity that the settings change; the other seven receive a score set by Pareto from the works cited in the table, which moves only with the battery chemistry and cathode recycling. The combined score is the average of the ten, weighted by the weights you choose: ignore, normal or double.

The rule for calculated themes. The score is 1 when the quantity is nil, rises in a straight line and reaches 5 at a ceiling specific to each theme. Beyond it, the score saturates: everything above the ceiling reads the same. The score is a reading rule laid over the measurement, not the measurement itself; the tonnes, kilowatt-hours and cubic metres stay displayed beside it.

The rule for themes with a set score. The seven other scores are set by Pareto, chain by chain, on the scale below. It describes what each level covers; it does not compute it. The three questions running through it are those by which the United Nations Guiding Principles judge the severity of an impact, "their scale, scope and irremediable character", and which the Quebec directive for environmental impact studies restates in its own way, an impact counting for more as it is wider, more frequent, more lasting or more intense.

LevelWhat it describes
1 · NegligibleNothing identifiable on this theme in this chain.
2 · BoundedA real impact, confined to one or two links of the chain, and one that restoration can undo.
3 · EstablishedA lasting impact on a major link, or a diffuse and slight one, whose repair is neither assured nor impossible.
4 · StrongA serious impact across several links, repeating with use, and only partly repairable.
5 · MaximalA serious impact present at every link, continuous, leaving a legacy no one takes back.

The half points are not a sixth level: they mark the gap that battery chemistry and a recycled cathode open between two otherwise identical cases, in themes 4 and 8. This is a risk scale, given in the form the UNEP guidelines call generic and themselves describe as the least transparent of their six: the level remains a judgement resting on the works cited in the table of ten themes. Computing it was attempted twice, with the United Nations severity criteria and then with an impact assessment grid tested blind by five readers; both times the instrument saturated, the petroleum chain scoring the maximum on all seven themes at once. So the scale describes, it does not compute. It weighs the two pure chains; the score of a plug-in hybrid is composed from both, by the rule that follows.

The rule for plug-in hybrids. When a plug-in hybrid is chosen from the list, the tool takes its smaller battery and its gasoline consumption from the catalogue. It assumes that 45 % of its kilometres are driven electric, the share the ICCT measures among private owners; the “Share of kilometres driven electric” slider adjusts it. The three calculated themes count that battery and that gasoline as such. On the seven themes with a set score, it receives the electric vehicle's score in full, since it carries a battery, plus the combustion vehicle's pressure pro rata of the litres it burns compared with the reference gasoline vehicle. A hybrid that burns half the Corolla's gasoline thus adds half of the four points the combustion vehicle carries above the minimum, and reads 4 out of 5 where the electric reads 2.

1. Climate
The greenhouse gases of the whole chain, in tonnes of CO₂e over the life of the vehicle. Electric side: charging infrastructure, factory and mine infrastructure, battery manufacturing, electricity consumed. Gasoline side: amortized oil infrastructure, upstream (extraction, flaring, leaks), refining, combustion. Score 5 at 109 t, which a combustion vehicle of about 10.9 L/100 km reaches over 300 000 km. Vehicle manufacturing counts in the chart and the verdict but stays outside this score, whose scale was set before it entered the calculation. Moves with mileage, the two consumptions, grid intensity, battery chemistry and capacity, crude intensity, the methane share and the horizon, which touches only methane.
2. Transformation energy
The primary energy committed, per kilometre. Electric: 450 kWh of primary energy per kWh of capacity to build the pack, plus the electricity charged. Gasoline: the energy content of the fuel, 8.9 kWh per litre, plus the energy spent before the pump, 21 % by default. Score 5 at 155 kWh per 100 km, a combustion vehicle of a little over 14 L/100 km. Scored on intensity rather than total, otherwise a large vehicle would saturate from the outset. Moves with battery capacity, the consumptions, mileage, which amortizes the pack, and upstream energy; a recycled cathode takes 18 % off pack manufacturing.
3. Water
Water lost, in cubic metres over the life of the vehicle. Electric: lithium extracted by evaporation, 400 m³ per tonne of lithium carbonate within a published range of 100 to 800, for the lithium the pack holds, 0.09 kg per kWh for LFP and 0.10 for NMC. Gasoline: 1.7 litres of water per litre refined. Score 5 at 72 m³, that is 14 L/100 km over 300 000 km. Moves with capacity and chemistry, mileage and gasoline consumption; a recycled cathode cuts the lithium water to a quarter.
4. Mineral resources and circularity
Set score. Electric: 3.5 for LFP, 3.8 for NMC, minus 1 with a recycled cathode. Gasoline: 3, for the cobalt and nickel catalysts of refining, the rare earths of cracking and the platinum-group metals of the catalytic converter. The only theme where the electric reads above the combustion vehicle; circularity is what can bring it back.
5. Land footprint
Set score: 3 against 5. On one side, mining footprints that are localized, intense but bounded; on the other, a worldwide network of wells, pipelines, refineries, tankers and stations.
6. Pollution of habitats and legacy liabilities
Set score: 2 against 5. Spills, soil contamination, acidification, liabilities left behind. The mining risk exists, the failure of a tailings dam, but it is localized where the oil chain is continuous.
7. Human health
Set score: 2 against 5. The electric has no tailpipe; wear particles remain, governed by mass. The combustion vehicle carries the 1 200 annual premature deaths from traffic in Canada, engine noise and the exposure of people living near refineries. Partly overlaps the social cost of carbon.
8. Labour and communities
Set score. Electric: 3.5 for LFP, 4 for NMC, minus 0.5 with a recycled cathode. Gasoline: 4. These are the “workers” and “local communities” categories of social life cycle assessment: NMC weighs through cobalt, LFP avoids it; oil weighs through the accident rate of extraction and refining and through the neighbourhoods nearby.
9. Societal robustness
Set score: 2 against 5. The exposure of the household and the economy to supply shocks: electricity produced here and priced through a public process, against an imported fuel whose price can move by half in a few months.
10. Democratic health
Set score: 2 against 5. The “society” category of social life cycle assessment: the weight of a sector on public decisions, read through climate lobbying. Concentrated on one side, dispersed on the other, without being nil.

What these scores are. The three calculated scores rest on published, adjustable aggregates; the seven set scores are Pareto's judgements, documented theme by theme in the table, and that is why each can be ignored or doubled.


Climate in detail: the carbon debt and the kilometre where it clears

Every chain counted, well to wheel on one side, dam to wheel on the other, manufacturing and infrastructure included. All of these figures are adjustable below. The International Energy Agency offers a similar balance sheet, without the infrastructure this tool adds, in its EV Life Cycle Assessment Calculator: it compares electric, plug-in hybrid and combustion vehicles country by country, and lets you set vehicle size, annual mileage, lifetime and grid intensity.

The figures at the start and at the end

The two starting debts, then the two balances at the end of the vehicle's life.

At kilometre zero: both vehicles start with a carbon debt

The myth assumes the combustion vehicle leaves the factory with a clean slate. It does not: to drive at all, it needs platforms, pipelines, tankers, refineries and filling stations, all already built and already amortizable against it. That debt exists; it is simply filed outside the vehicle's balance sheet. Here are the two starting debts, in tonnes of CO₂ equivalent (t CO₂e): only what is genuinely paid before the first kilometre, on both sides.

Starting debt: electric
t CO₂e
Starting debt: combustion
t CO₂e
Net gap at the start
t CO₂e
Gap cleared after
km

At the end of its life: the vehicle's carbon balance

Electric
t CO₂e
Combustion
t CO₂e
Emissions gap
× less
Social cost avoided
CAD

Where the carbon goes, and from which kilometre on

Breakdown over the vehicle's life

Electric
Vehicle manufacturing Charging and grid infrastructure Plant and mine infrastructure Battery manufacturing Electricity consumed
Combustion
Vehicle manufacturing Amortized oil infrastructure Refining Upstream: extraction, flaring, leaks Combustion

Cumulative emissions, kilometre by kilometre

An outside benchmark: 17 000 km. The ICCT ran this same exercise for the European Union in 2025 and puts the crossover at about 17 000 km (one to two years of driving), even though manufacturing the electric car emits about 40 % more. With the current settings, this tool puts the crossover at about 17 500 km. By default, two differences roughly cancel out:

What brings our crossover forward. A grid far less carbon-intensive than Europe's, and the amortized oil infrastructure, which the ICCT does not count.

What pushes it back. A bigger battery with a heavier footprint: 64 kWh at 82 kg CO₂e/kWh, plus 4 kg for the plants and mines, against 53.4 kWh at 72.8 kg CO₂e/kWh for the ICCT. That is 5.5 t against 3.9 t.

The figure that matters most is another one: their 2025 estimate is 24 % lower than the one they published in 2021, because the grid is decarbonizing faster than expected. Year after year, life-cycle analyses widen the electric car's lead. ICCT, 2025


The wallet: does the electric car's higher price pay for itself?

This calculator reuses the lifetime mileage and the two consumption figures, adjustable below just as they are in the settings, and adds the values you can change here. The default choice sets two dominant market archetypes against each other: the mainstream combustion benchmark and the most widely sold all-electric vehicle. Enter the prices actually paid, taxes and government rebates included. Maintenance is estimated automatically.

Quebec scenarios

These three settings are the ones the calculation below depends on; they also drive the verdict at the top of the page, and reappear in the Settings further down: move one and the other follows. The remaining assumptions, battery chemistry, grid intensity and crude origin, live in the settings.

fields specific to the electric vehicle  ·  fields specific to the combustion vehicle  ·  the down payment and the loan term apply to both.

CAD, total price paidReference modelThe default price is that of a Tesla Model 3 RWD, taxes and government rebates included. It is a benchmark, not a quote: enter the price you are offered. Change it and the gap with the benchmark appears here.
CAD, total price paidReference modelThe default price is that of a Toyota Corolla XSE CVT, taxes included. It is a benchmark, not a quote: enter the price you are offered. Change it and the gap with the benchmark appears here.
$ per litre
$ per kWh, residential rate
CAD, installation included, rebate deductedWhat this amount coversThe charger itself costs about $600, and installation $600 to $800 more. Quebec refunds $600 on the charger alone through its Écorecharge program, provided it cost at least $600 before tax; installation is not covered. The bill therefore comes to $600 or $800. The default takes the low end of that range. If an ordinary 120 V outlet is enough for your driving, a block heater outlet for instance, enter $0: see question 7.Écorecharge, Québec.ca
% a year, 0 for a cash purchase
% a year, 0 for a cash purchase
CAD, paid in cash, the same for both
months, 0 for a cash purchase

The kilometre where the higher price is paid back

Both lines add everything up: purchase price, interest, energy and maintenance.

An outside benchmark. Clean Energy Canada compared two pairs of new vehicles for a Montreal household: the Kia EV4 against the Kia K4, and the Chevrolet Equinox EV against its gasoline version. Over ten years, the electric vehicle costs $235 less per month for the sedan and $273 less for the SUV, or about $28 000 and $33 000. The assumptions are published: 20 000 km a year like ours, 2025 energy prices and the rebates in force on March 16, 2026. Three differences rule out a dollar-for-dollar comparison. The horizon is ten years rather than the lifetime mileage set above. Resale value is deducted there, whereas our calculator leaves it out (FAQ 4). Finally, insurance and taxes are counted. The direction, however, matches ours at the default settings. Clean Energy Canada advocates for the shift to clean technologies, and this report is funded by the RBC Foundation. Clean Energy Canada, 2026

What the calculation assumes: maintenance, financing, credits, and what it leaves out

Maintenance. A synthetic oil change at $150 every 8 000 km for the combustion vehicle, none for the electric one. A brake replacement at $700 every 60 000 km for the combustion vehicle against every 150 000 km for the electric one, regenerative braking sparing the pads.

Five engine items. They come from table 3.16 of an Argonne National Laboratory report (Burnham et al., 2021), at its intervals, and the electric vehicle needs none of them. Spark plugs cost $417 every 96 561 km, and the engine air filter $74 every 48 280 km. Transmission fluid costs $370 and the accessory drive belt $305, both every 144 841 km, and engine coolant $352 every 201 168 km. Costs are adjusted to 2026 Canadian dollars, for U.S. inflation and the exchange rate.

Tyres. The same Argonne table counts a set of four tyres at $525 in 2019 U.S. dollars, or $972 here, every 50 000 miles, or 80 467 km, whatever the powertrain. Yet an electric car weighs about 20 % more than its gasoline equivalent. According to an EIT Urban Mobility study (2025), it therefore wears its tyres about 20 % more: its sets last 67 056 km. A plug-in hybrid, weighed down by its battery, takes the same factor. Goodyear, cited by Argonne, goes as far as 30 %.

What maintenance leaves out. The calculation does not take three other items from Argonne's table: the timing belt, which chain-driven engines such as the Corolla's do not have, the oxygen sensor and the fuel filter. On the electric side, it leaves out the battery coolant change, which Argonne schedules every 125 000 miles: recent electric vehicles no longer need it, the Model 3 owner's manual stating that this coolant “does not need to be replaced for the life of your vehicle under most circumstances”. It also ignores the exhaust. An outside benchmark: in France, ROOLE's survey of car budgets puts routine maintenance at €345 a year for an electric, against €598 for a combustion car, 42 % less, at 12 000 km a year. Its items differ from ours. ROOLE, 2026

Financing. Interest is calculated on a level-payment loan against the balance, that is the price minus the down payment. The down payment is assumed identical for both vehicles, since it reflects the money the buyer has rather than the vehicle chosen. Enter 0 as the term, 0 as the rate, or a down payment equal to the price to simulate a cash purchase. Both rates default to the same value, so that the comparison is about the vehicle alone; adjust them if the terms you are offered differ.

Clean Fuel Regulations credits. This federal regulation requires gasoline suppliers to lower the carbon intensity of their fuels. Electricity that powers a vehicle in place of gasoline creates credits that they buy. For a home charger, a registered company creates them and passes part of their value on to the owner; Quebec's Ministry of the Environment keeps a list of them (in French). Their rates range from 3 to 18¢ per kWh, and their conditions differ widely: the next fold, Home-charger credit programs, compares them. The checkbox counts 10¢, the most common rate, before tax, for a connected charger of an eligible model. It is ticked by default, which assumes the buyer signs up for one of these programs: untick it otherwise. It stops at the end of 2035, nine years for a 2026 purchase: section 102 of the regulation allows no credits for a residential charger beyond that year. Since the chart only draws straight lines, the amount is spread over the whole life of the vehicle: the payback kilometre comes out a little late, never too early.

Registration contribution. From January 1, 2027, Quebec adds to registration fees an annual contribution of $125 for an electric vehicle and $62.50 for a plug-in hybrid (Radio-Canada, March 2025, in French). It makes up for the fuel tax they do not pay, which the price of gasoline already counts on the other side. Indexed to inflation, it stays constant in today's dollars, like the whole calculation. Since the purchase is assumed in 2026, the first year escapes it: 14 years out of 15 at the default mileage.

Luxury vehicle duty. From January 1, 2027, Quebec levies each year 1 % of the part of the value above $62 500, electric vehicles included, on a vehicle 7 years old or less. The calculation counts it from 2027 to 2033, on the price entered without taxes. The value then falls by 7 % a year, the rule the regulation applies when the valuation guide does not list the model; a real wholesale price falls faster. Two things are ignored: rebates, which would have to be added back to the price, and mass, a vehicle over 3 000 kg being exempt. Among the archetypes, only the Silverado EV pays it, $4 in 2027, though its mass, close to four tonnes, would exempt it.

What stays outside the calculation. Insurance (FAQ 3), the base registration fee, the same on both sides, what is added to it for a large engine, and resale value (FAQ 4).

Home-charger credit programs: from 3 to 18¢ per kWh depending on the company

Ten companies appear on the Ministry of the Environment’s list (in French) as of October 5, 2026. Their conditions were read on their own pages on October 16, 2026. Several have changed their rates since the spring, and all reserve the right to do so again. Several sell the eligible chargers.

Pareto recommends no offer.

In Quebec, the free charger is not advisable. Écorecharge refunds $600 on an eligible charger that cost at least $600 before tax, and explicitly excludes a charger obtained free of charge from a home-charging rewards company (Québec.ca). A purchased charger therefore costs about the same, without the lower starting rate or the deposit that come with a free one.

The ease-of-use score starts at 5 and loses one point per obstacle, out of four:

  • Access. Enrolment goes through an invitation, or an application the company may refuse.
  • Hardware. It takes a charger of a single brand, or a deposit.
  • Payout. Payment comes less than once a quarter, in something other than money, with a threshold above $50, or whatever stays under a threshold is lost.
  • Clarity. The rate of a given charger changes by tiers, temporary bonuses or history, or is called indicative, or the conditions do not exist in French.
ProgramRate in QuebecEligible chargersPayoutEase of use
ChargeLab10¢A compatible smart charger, among about ten brands, in a single-family homeEvery quarter, in gift cards, with cash payouts announced for the end of 2026; under $5, the quarter is lost4Payout
Variablegridsold at Kia and other authorized dealers10¢Variablegrid RS40 or RS48On request from $50; nothing expires4Hardware
Chargy10¢, in months of at least 100 kWhAny OCPP charger except Tesla, ChargePoint, FLO and PionEvery month, by Interac e-Transfer; nothing under 100 kWh3Payout, clarity
Grizzl-E Club3¢, then 1¢ more every 5 000 kWh, up to 10¢ from 35 000 kWh; 5¢ to start for a purchased chargerGrizzl-E only, against a $100 deposit refunded after the first chargeEvery month, from $102Access, hardware, clarity
SWTCHFree charger: 3¢ on the first 1 500 kWh, then 11¢; purchased charger: 11¢Its own only, free against a $300 deposit, or purchasedBy direct deposit, in $100 increments2Hardware, payout, clarity
Pion PowerGreenMiles10¢; 16¢ beyond 5 000 kWh during a fall promotionPion Flex-AC onlyOnce a year, in $100 increments, the remainder carried over2Hardware, payout, clarity
TechnoVEEcoWatt12¢, a rate called indicative, revised every JulyTechnoVE only, made since 2020, on Wi-Fi and without a screenOnce a year, by cheque, the first in summer 2027, if the credits sell2Hardware, payout, clarity
Roulez Électrique13¢ for most chargers, including Tesla and Wallbox; 15¢ FractalEV, 18¢ Sigenergy, in one-cent pointsAny OCPP charger, and Tesla wall connectorsOnce a year2Access, payout, clarity
WattsApp21¢ in October 2026, of which 18 are temporary or optional bonuses; 3¢ without bonusesTesla wall connector onlyOn request from $100, once the credits are verified, in the first quarter of the following year2Hardware, payout, clarity
DashSharing3¢ on the first 1 500 kWh, then 11¢Its own only, against a depositBy transfer, in $100 increments1Access, hardware, payout, clarity

FLO offers no program to individuals: its credits page is aimed at commercial chargers. No program announces an end date, and all depend on the regulation staying in force.


Settings

Each slider shows its documented range. Any change feeds straight through to everything above it: the verdict, the impacts table, the charts and the wallet.

Vehicle use

The mileage over which manufacturing is amortized. By default, 300 000 km, or 15 years at 20 000 km a year; the second tick marks the 198 000 km of Quebec's environment ministry, 12 years at 16 500 km. The shorter the mileage, the more battery manufacturing weighs per kilometre.
Where this figure comes from
300 000 km is the age at which a vehicle becomes eligible for Canadian scrappage programs, 15 years at the Canadian average of 20 000 km a year used by the ICCT, which stretches useful life as far as 25 years, or 500 000 km, the top of the slider. Quebec's environment ministry works from a much shorter assumption when costing the ZEV standard, 12 years at 16 500 km a year, or 198 000 km: at that mileage, battery manufacturing weighs about 50 % more per kilometre than at 300 000 km. On how long batteries actually last, see question 1. ICCT, Canadian scrappage analysis, 2020 · MELCCFP, assumptions of the ZEV standard impact analysis, 2026
By default, 6.8 L/100 km, the combined type-approval rating of a gasoline Toyota Corolla, a compact sedan. Quebec's fleet averages 9.2 L; a real-world SUV often exceeds 9 L, a pickup approaches 12 L.
Where this figure comes from
That is a low figure by the standards of what actually sells: the average across Quebec's whole light-vehicle fleet is 9.2 L/100 km, the gap coming down to the size of the vehicles bought. A conventional hybrid sits closer to 4.4 to 6 L, while a plug-in hybrid in real use often exceeds its type-approval figures, for want of being plugged in as often as the test assumes (see question 9). The slider spans the full range Natural Resources Canada publishes for model year 2026: from 4.4 L, the lowest combined rating of that year, to 20 L, one notch above the thirstiest, a Ford F-150 Raptor R at 19.7 L. The median across the 578 gasoline versions sold new that year is 10.7 L, well above the Corolla used here: the fleet on the road burns less than what is sold today, because it still carries yesterday's small vehicles. Chair in Energy Sector Management, HEC Montréal: Quebec's vehicle fleet (in French) · Natural Resources Canada, fuel consumption ratings
Charging losses included. By default, 15.3 kWh/100 km, the combined type-approval rating of a Tesla Model 3 Rear-Wheel Drive, the electric counterpart of the compact sedan set just above. A Quebec winter pushes this upward; a large SUV runs around 25, an electric pickup 35 to 45.
Where this figure comes from
Remember to raise this slider if you increase battery capacity: a heavier vehicle uses more. Natural Resources Canada, fuel consumption ratings
Advanced settingselectricity chain, oil chain and accounting conventions

Electricity chain

Raising this slider makes every kilometre driven on electricity heavier and pushes back the break-even kilometre. Reference points: 1.2 g (Quebec generation, life cycle excluded) · 34.5 g (full life cycle, reservoirs and imports included) · 100 g (Canada) · 473 g (world) · 630 g (Saskatchewan, the most carbon-intensive grid in the country). Hydro-Québec · Levasseur et al., Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2021 · CER · Ember, Global Electricity Review 2025 · Electricity Maps, live
Switching from LFP to NMC makes the battery's manufacturing debt heavier and raises the pressure on minerals. LFP (iron phosphate) needs neither cobalt nor nickel. NMC 811 is denser in energy, so lighter for a given capacity, but its cathode is 80 % nickel and 10 % cobalt, which raises its footprint and above all its variance. Changing chemistry adjusts the footprint, the pack mass and the minerals score. Two other nickel chemistries exist, NCA and its NCMA variant: denser still, the former being the most cobalt-rich. They have no button here, but vehicles carrying them are computed all the same, see the note below.On the nickel chemistries. No published life-cycle assessment covers NCA or NCMA at the same level of detail as NMC 811 and LFP. Vehicles carrying them are therefore computed on the NMC 811 curve: the study that sets these ranges itself set aside NMC 955, very close to NCMA, judging that the difference would shift its results only slightly. And for some vehicles the chemistry is published nowhere: the vehicle selector then shows “estimate”.
LFP
NMC 811
Raising the slider of the selected chemistry makes battery manufacturing heavier and pushes back the break-even kilometre. The values shown include the cells and 20 kg CO₂e/kWh for the rest of the battery: housing, electronics and transport.
Where this figure comes from
Each chemistry keeps its own scale, so that the same slider position never means two different things. Only the row of the selected chemistry feeds the calculation; the other stays visible for comparison.

The cells. Peiseler et al. give, at the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles: LFP 54, 62 and 69 kg CO₂e/kWh; NMC 811: 59, 74 and 115. The NMC's long upper tail comes from lateritic nickel. These figures cover the cells alone; the slider adds the 20 kg for the rest of the battery and so shows 74, 82 and 89 for LFP, 79, 94 and 135 for NMC. They model operating costs and exclude investment in plants and equipment, hence the next slider. This value adjusts itself if you select a cathode made from recycled materials.

The rest of the battery. Modules, aluminium housing, electronics, cooling and transport make up about 15 % of a battery made in China, according to ADEME, or roughly 20 kg CO₂e/kWh. Aluminium accounts for more than half of it. With low-carbon aluminium, this item would fall to about 12 to 15 kg.

Three sources, and the middle value. For a complete battery made in China, in kg CO₂e/kWh:
SourceLFPNMC
ICCTArgonne's GREET model, 20246979
Peiseler et al.Cells, 2024, plus 20 kg for the rest of the battery according to ADEME8294
ADEMEecoinvent 3.11 database≈ 125140
By default, the tool uses the middle value, that of Peiseler's study, the only peer-reviewed article of the three, or 82 and 94. The low end of the range underestimates Indonesian nickel, according to Peiseler. ADEME's high end comes mostly from the anode's synthetic graphite, four times more emitting in a recent inventory that the ecoinvent database has taken up. That inventory rests on a single study, carried out with a European maker of anode graphite. ADEME acknowledges that it exceeds the literature, around 100 kg, and rates its own LFP data as weak.

Peiseler et al., Nature Communications, 2024 · ADEME, carbon footprint of batteries, 2026 · ICCT, GREET, 2025 · Carrère et al., Journal of Energy Storage, 2024 · Lai et al., J. Cleaner Production, 2022
What a cathode made of recovered materials changes. Choosing recycled materials trims the battery's footprint, lithium water, manufacturing energy and the pressure on minerals. The footprint slider above adjusts automatically when you switch this option, and you remain free to move it afterwards.

At the level of the complete battery pack. A life-cycle assessment published in March 2026, built on operating data from 46 facilities covering roughly half of world recycling capacity, puts the gain at 11 % for an LFP chemistry and 24 % for an NMC 811. That is the value the tool applies, because it covers the same thing as the rest of this page.

At the level of the material alone, the gain is far larger. A study in Nature Communications finds that turning end-of-life batteries into battery-grade materials cuts impacts by at least 58 % compared with the mining route. The gap between the two figures is not a contradiction: the cathode is only part of the pack, the rest coming from the anode, the casing and above all the electricity used to make the cells.

Effect on the other themes. Turning this option on also eases the pressure on metals, on water and on manufacturing energy, since primary extraction is largely displaced. Those effects are derived from recovery rates rather than taken directly from the two studies.

Industrial LCA, March 2026 · Nature Communications, 2025
Raising this slider makes the electric vehicle's manufacturing debt heavier and pushes back the break-even kilometre. Building the gigafactories, the mines and the material refineries, amortized over their output. Added so that both chains are treated the same way: without it, infrastructure would be charged to oil but not to the battery. Order of magnitude 5 to 15 % of the direct footprint, consistent with the literature on capital-goods truncation. Detailed method in-house calculation
Raising this slider adds to the electric vehicle's manufacturing debt and pushes back the break-even kilometre. What is specific to the vehicle: the home charger and its connection (about 50 kg CO₂e), a share of the public charging network amortized over the fleet it serves (about 20 kg), and marginal reinforcement of the distribution grid (about 30 kg). Electricity generation and transmission are excluded, because dams, lines and wind farms are already inside Hydro-Québec's 34.5 g CO₂e/kWh. Detailed method · Hydro-Québec, 2035 Action Plan in-house calculation
What this item covers. Counting this item makes both vehicles' manufacturing debt heavier and, for the same segment, brings the break-even kilometre forward. The production and recycling of the glider and the powertrain: chassis, body, engine, transmission, exhaust. The battery is excluded, as the sliders above already count it. The calculation. The average mass of the segment, multiplied by a factor per tonne of vehicle: 5.2 t CO₂e for a combustion vehicle, 4.7 for an electric one, which is 10 % less for want of an engine, a gearbox and an exhaust. The segment is read from the category of the model picked in either list, or from the archetype when no model is chosen; each column takes its own, so that a sedan compared with an SUV shows it. The masses used are United States model-year 2024 averages weighted by production volumes: car 1 520 kg, SUV 1 915 kg, pickup 2 263 kg, minivan 2 044 kg. The same mass serves both columns, and that is deliberate: the factor applies to a vehicle of equivalent utility, whereas the mass of an electric vehicle is inflated by its battery, already counted elsewhere. What this item leaves alone. The climate score out of 5, whose 109 t scale has not been rebuilt: it keeps the perimeter of earlier versions, and the theme receipt says so. Caveat. The pickup weighs 17 % more than the heaviest vehicle the factor was calibrated on, a 1 935 kg American SUV. That is an extrapolation, modest but real. ICCT, 2021: both factors, table A.1 · EPA, model-year 2024 data: the masses
Raising this slider increases the battery's footprint, lithium water and manufacturing energy, and pushes back the break-even kilometre. From the city car to the large SUV or the electric pickup. Pack mass and the minerals score follow the chemistry selected above.

Oil chain

Crude origin
Raising this slider makes the gasoline vehicle's upstream item heavier, litre after litre, and brings the break-even kilometre forward. Extraction, flaring and leaks, from well to refinery. World average 10.3; national averages range from 3.3 (Denmark) to 20.3 (Algeria). Canada is among the four most intensive producers, the Alberta oil sands sitting around 15 to 20. The authors note that methane leaks are poorly documented and can raise these figures appreciably. Masnadi et al., Science, 2018 · S&P Global, oil sands
Raising the share or choosing the short horizon makes the gasoline vehicle's upstream heavier and brings the break-even kilometre forward. Methane escapes from wells, pipelines and flares. It warms far harder than CO₂, but for less time: one tonne is worth thirty over a hundred years, eighty-two over twenty. It is the same gas; only the period over which its effect is measured changes.

The crude intensity set just above assumes, as the original publication does, that methane accounts for about one third of upstream emissions. This slider lets you contest that share. Leaving it at 33 % reproduces the published value. Raising it increases the total, since methane is then added to an unchanged non-methane component: that is what the IEA's satellite measurements suggest, finding leaks above the averages used in life-cycle assessments. The two buttons then choose the horizon, and only the methane share responds. IEA, Global Methane Tracker 2026
Raising this slider makes the refining of every litre of gasoline heavier and brings the break-even kilometre forward. Desulphurization, cracking, hydrogen. Varies widely with the heaviness of the crude processed. Jing et al., Nature Climate Change, 2020
Raising this slider lifts the gasoline vehicle's energy score, without touching emissions or the break-even kilometre. Energy spent extracting, shipping and refining the crude, expressed as a percentage of the energy content of the litre delivered at the pump. At 17 %, obtaining 100 units of energy as gasoline consumes 17 upstream. This is primary energy in every form, mostly natural gas and petroleum products burned on site, and not electricity. The Alberta oil sands sit closer to 25 to 30 %: it takes steam to mobilize the bitumen, then hydrogen to upgrade it into synthetic crude. That range was inferred from the ratio between their upstream carbon intensity and the world average; a published measurement bears it out. Brandt et al. put the energy return of oil sands extraction in 2010 at 3.5 to 4 GJ produced per GJ consumed in situ, that is 25 to 29 % of output fed back upstream, and 5.5 to 6 for mining operations. Their scope stops at extraction, however: across forty conventional fields, the same authors find a production-weighted average of 33 to 1, barely 3 %. Which is the reminder that most of this percentage comes from refining and shipping, not from the well. in-house calculation · Brandt, Englander and Bharadwaj, Energy, 2013 · Brandt et al., PLOS One, 2015
Raising this slider makes the gasoline vehicle's starting debt heavier and brings the break-even kilometre forward. A share of the entire stock still in operation (platforms, wells, pipelines, tankers, refineries, depots, tanker trucks, filling stations), a world stock on the order of $19 trillion. This infrastructure is dedicated to oil: these facilities exist only to extract, move and transform crude. Fuels are their main outlet (road transport alone absorbs about 45 % of world demand), but not the only one: petrochemicals, which feed plastics and synthetic fibres, take about 15 %, the rest going to aviation, shipping, lubricants and asphalt. Since amortization is per litre of refined product, that non-fuel share already carries its own portion of the capital. Amortized over throughput of about 5 800 billion litres a year, it works out to 50 to 120 g CO₂e per litre, or 0.7 to 1.5 t over the vehicle's life. The stock is colossal, but so is what flows through it: it is the denominator that flattens the result, not an omission. The full calculation · IEA, upstream capex of about $570 billion a year in-house calculation

Accounting conventions

Raising this slider inflates the dollar figure of climate damages in the verdict, without changing a tonne of the carbon balance. The damage one additional tonne of CO₂ will cause, over centuries, converted into dollars. What this price counts: excess deaths from heat, lost agricultural yields, sea-level rise, heating and cooling costs. What it does not count: biodiversity, conflict, migration, tipping points. It is therefore a lower bound.
Environment and Climate Change Canada uses C$275 a tonne for 2026, in constant 2021 dollars: that is the default here. Its trajectory rises to $294 in 2030. Rennert et al., Nature, 2022, converge: US$185 a tonne, a range of $44 to $413 between the 5th and 95th percentiles in 2020 dollars, or about C$250, which is where the slider's $59 to $554 range comes from.
This slider puts a price on carbon alone, and carbon is not the whole of what driving costs society: add air pollutants, congestion, collisions, the road network and the land it occupies. No setting in this tool puts a dollar figure on any of them, and that is deliberate: they follow from the mode of travel far more than from the powertrain, so they would barely separate an electric car from a gasoline one. They change everything, on the other hand, as soon as the car is compared with walking, cycling or public transit, which is what the The choice of mode, before the choice of vehicle section does. Rennert et al., Nature · ECCC, social cost of GHGs
Notes on the calculationsmethod, assumptions and how the infrastructure items are modelled

Three items are covered by no published life-cycle assessment, precisely because they fall in the blind spot this tool sets out to light up. They have been modelled here following standard LCA conventions, from published and verifiable aggregates. Here is the chain of reasoning, at a high level.

Battery industrial infrastructure

Why this item. For symmetry, and for a specific reason: the reference we use for the battery footprint models operating costs: electricity, reagents, on-site and off-site transport. Its authors state that transport costs were converted into diesel purchases because that category does not include capital expenditure on vehicles and infrastructure, and that depreciation is among the costs left outside the calculation base. The cell manufacturing stage draws on ecoinvent, which covers infrastructure only partly, with the well-known truncation of process-based LCA. The 54 to 69 kg CO₂e/kWh are therefore essentially direct emissions.

Our calculation. Investment per gigawatt-hour of annual cell-plant capacity, amortized over its cumulative output, converted into emissions through the carbon intensity of a dollar of industrial construction, then increased by the capital of the mines and material refineries. The result, a few kilograms of CO₂e per kilowatt-hour, matches 5 to 15 % of the direct footprint, the order of magnitude the literature attributes to omitted capital goods. Peiseler et al., Nature Communications, 2024

Amortized oil infrastructure

The method. A hybrid input-output route, applied to the entire stock still in operation. The world stock breaks down roughly as follows: upstream (wells, platforms, gathering) $11–14 trillion; transport and storage (pipelines, tankers, terminals) $2–3 trillion; refining, about 825 active plants, $2.5–4 trillion; retail distribution (depots, tanker trucks, filling stations) $0.5–1.5 trillion. Total on the order of $19 trillion.

The calculation. This stock, set against world throughput of about 5 800 billion litres of refined product a year and an average asset life of about 25 years, gives roughly $0.13 of capital per litre. Converted through the carbon intensity of a dollar of heavy construction, 0.4 to 0.9 kg CO₂e, we get 50 to 120 g CO₂e per litre, or 0.7 to 1.5 t for the litres consumed over the vehicle's life. A cross-check through flows gives the same result: the IEA's $570 billion of annual upstream investment, increased by the rest of the chain, divided by annual throughput.

What the figure says. It looks small against the immensity of the oil estate, and that is precisely the lesson: the denominator is colossal too. This page's argument therefore rests not on capital, which weighs about a tonne, but on flows, which weigh nearly forty.

Charging and grid infrastructure

What the item covers. The electric counterpart to oil infrastructure, so that each chain carries its own infrastructure. This item covers only equipment specific to the vehicle: home charger and connection, about 50 kg CO₂e; a share of the public charging network amortized over the fleet it serves, about 20 kg; marginal reinforcement of the distribution grid, about 30 kg. Total on the order of 0.1 t, or roughly 2 % of the electric vehicle's total footprint. Electricity generation and transmission are excluded for two reasons.

First, a risk of double counting. Dams, lines and wind farms are already inside the 34.5 g CO₂e/kWh published by Hydro-Québec and used above.

Second, the nature of the capital. The 2035 Action Plan foresees $155–185 billion of investment, of which $90–110 billion to meet demand growth, but that demand comes from every use. Electrifying 5.1 million vehicles would account for only about ten per cent of the 150 to 200 additional TWh targeted by 2050; the rest serves heating, industry, greenhouses, exports. A dam would exist without electric vehicles, which connect to it at marginal cost, and it supplies sectors unrelated to mobility.

Dedicated versus shared. A refinery and a pipeline serve nothing but oil. Their outlets are not fuels alone, since petrochemicals take about 15 % and the rest goes to aviation, shipping, lubricants and asphalt, but all belong to the same system. Amortizing per litre of refined product does spread the capital across all of those outlets, petrochemicals included. Oil infrastructure is dedicated, electric infrastructure is shared, and the gap between the two amounts reflects a real difference rather than an omission.

One caveat to keep in mind, and a real one. This reasoning holds for one additional vehicle today, connecting to a grid that already exists. It does not hold for an entire fleet: the share of electric infrastructure attributable to mobility grows with the rate of electrification, and Hydro-Québec already puts the capacity need tied to charging at 2 922 MW in 2035, a third of the capacity it plans to add. Oil infrastructure stays dedicated and electric infrastructure stays shared, but the gap between the two narrows as the fleet electrifies. The tool models a marginal vehicle, not a fleet-wide transition. See question 8 of the FAQ. Hydro-Québec, 2035 Action Plan

Limits to own up to. Grid and crude carbon intensities change over time; check the linked sources before quoting a figure. The three items above are the only ones calculated in house, and two frequent objections are addressed in the FAQ. The rule behind each score in the ten-theme table is set out under How the ten themes are scored.

The status of these figures. They are defensible orders of magnitude, not measurements, and they have not been peer reviewed. Each rests on world aggregates whose sources are linked, and on allocations that remain choices. That is why all of them are adjustable: if you find an allocation too generous, pull the slider back. The overall conclusion depends on none of these items taken alone.



Frequently asked questions

Ten common objections, each with what the measurements say; the last is the one the verdict points to.

1. Does the battery outlive the vehicle?Yes, in the great majority of cases.

Yes, in the great majority of cases. The debate now turns on slow wear: how much range is left in year fifteen?

Worth a grain of salt. Degradation studies cover batteries put on the road several years ago; chemistry, thermal management and charging have improved a great deal since, and the vehicles sold today should age better than these figures suggest.

What the fleets measure

Failure has become rare. Across about 15 000 vehicles from 2011 to 2023, recalls excluded, Recurrent measures a replacement rate of 7.5 % for 2011 models, then a drop of an order of magnitude from 2016 on, down to 0.3 % for vehicles from 2022 and later. Stories of batteries dying at 100 000 km describe a technology that has not been sold for ten years.

The loss is concentrated early. P3 and Aviloo measured more than 7 000 vehicles from every manufacturer, some beyond 300 000 km: about 95 % of capacity at 30 000 km, 90 % at 100 000 km, then a plateau around 87 % between 200 000 and 300 000 km. The curve flattens instead of collapsing.

How you charge matters more than age. Geotab, across more than 22 700 vehicles and 21 models, puts the average at 2.3 % loss a year. But that average covers opposite uses: 1.5 % for those who rarely fast-charge, against 3 % for frequent use of chargers above 100 kW. That is the variable the owner controls.

Certificates confirm the plateau. Arval gathered 24 000 state-of-health certificates in 11 countries, issued by two independent bodies, Moba and Aviloo. For electrics, capacity drops to 96 % over the first 10 000 kilometres, then loses about 1 % every 25 000 km: 93 % at 70 000 km, 89 % at 200 000 km. That is about 1.7 % a year.

What we use: 80 %. The two readings bracket the result. At 1.5 % a year compounded over fifteen years, about 80 % of capacity remains; following P3's mileage curve out to 300 000 km, about 87 %. The gap comes from the fact that calendar ageing and use-related ageing do not simply add up. We take the cautious bound, knowing that it probably understates real capacity. Either way, we stay well above the 70 % warranty threshold.

Why the old numbers frighten people. Geotab measures 4.2 % annual loss on an air-cooled 2015 Nissan Leaf, against 2.3 % on a liquid-cooled Tesla Model S of the same year: the early studies describe the absence of thermal management more than they describe a battery. The laboratory itself is pessimistic, as Nature Energy showed in 2024: constant-current cycling understates lifetime by as much as 38 % compared with real driving.

A concrete case. The ADAC drove a VW ID.3 for 160 000 km over four years, with more than 40 % of charging on DC fast chargers and long stays parked at full charge, exactly the practices that are advised against. Remaining capacity: 91 %.

And 80 % is not a failure: it is a fifth less range, on batteries whose size grew by 167 % between 2015 and 2024. The remaining uncertainty leans the right way, since the LFP batteries sold today are too recent to appear in this data.

Recurrent, replacement rates · P3 and Aviloo, ageing in real use · Geotab, 22 700 vehicles · Arval, 24 000 certificates · Geslin et al., Nature Energy, 2024 · ADAC, long-term ID.3 test

2. What if I keep my old combustion vehicle instead of buying a new electric one?Do not wait for the combustion vehicle to die.

Three things to remember

Do not wait for the combustion vehicle to die. Three independent analyses, on three different grids, reach the same conclusion. On the Quebec grid, manufacturing the electric vehicle is paid back in about a year of normal driving.

The more you drive, the clearer the gain. High-mileage drivers should switch first. That is where each battery built delivers the most, and it is also where the arithmetic is kindest to the wallet.

Below roughly 2 000 km a year, keep the combustion vehicle. At that rate, the battery ages faster than it pays back its manufacturing. Between 2 000 and 6 000 km a year, the gain exists but stays modest. Above that, it is decisive. For those who drive little, a car sharing membership or a vehicle shared with a neighbour is often better than owning one. Fixed costs, such as insurance and registration, then weigh heavily on every kilometre.

This tool compares two new vehicles, which is not most people's situation. Many already own a gasoline vehicle and wonder whether to make it last. That question is a different one, and harder.

Making an object last avoids building another one, which is almost always the right ecological reflex.

The combustion car is one of the rare exceptions to that rule, along with the gas furnace, because its use phase dwarfs its manufacturing phase: every additional kilometre costs more than building a replacement would cost once.

Campbell and Geyer put a number on that exception in Science in August 2026, across the entire US fleet. Retiring a still-running combustion vehicle to replace it with an electric one reduces emissions in 92 % of the configurations examined, including when the combustion vehicle is new.

Two caveats on that result. It assumes the combustion vehicle is taken off the road. If it is resold, the balance depends on who buys it: it is a gain if it saves the buyer from buying new, if it replaces an older and dirtier vehicle, or if it goes to someone who drives less than you, the vehicle then burning less fuel per year; it is a loss if it puts someone behind a wheel who had no vehicle at all. Campbell and Geyer model only that last case and conclude that the gain disappears beyond 65 % of shift toward car use, on an average grid. Second caveat: none of this speaks about money. Scrapping a working vehicle remains economically irrational without a buy-back program, as the authors also point out.

Le Réveilleur devoted an entire video to this question, with its full sources. We recommend it for the long version. It is in French.

Campbell and Geyer, Science, 2026 · Keeping your old combustion car: greener, really? (in French) · Source page

3. Does an electric vehicle cost more to insure than a combustion vehicle of the same price?No, and on some models it costs less.

No, and on some models it costs less. An electric vehicle does insure for more on average, but that is because it sells for more: a premium is calculated on the value of the vehicle. At a comparable price, the drivetrain changes almost nothing.

The myth was true, ten years ago

The purchase price gap was enormous. In 2016 an electric vehicle sold for nearly 80% more than its gasoline twin, and the Highway Loss Data Institute measured a collision bill 63.5% higher for the Tesla Model S than for comparable luxury sedans. The premium followed the price, as it always does.

Insurers and body shops had no experience. Unable to diagnose a battery that had taken a knock, they preferred to write the vehicle off rather than carry the risk. In 2013 an electric vehicle declared a total loss cost its insurer US$13 963 more than an equivalent combustion one.

The same body measured the gap disappearing. In 2020, comparing the same models in both of their drivetrains, the HLDI found 20% fewer crashes and 19% less cost to the insurer; when a crash does happen, the bill is higher by just 1%, too little to be told apart from chance. And the trade has learned: Thatcham Research puts at 10.7% the fall in the cost of repairing an electric vehicle as workshops gain experience.

One item really does cost more: repair. After a knock, the body shop bill is steeper for an electric vehicle: C$6 645 on average in Canada against C$5 411 for a combustion one in the second quarter of 2026, according to Mitchell, a gap of C$1 234. Two reasons: the parts almost always come from the manufacturer, 85% of the parts bill in North America against 61% for a combustion vehicle, and the cameras and radars of the driver assistance systems have to be recalibrated after the slightest impact. It is nonetheless the smallest gap Mitchell has ever measured on repairable vehicles, in Canada as in the United States.

In plain terms. If you are choosing between two vehicles of comparable price, insurance should not tip the balance. Ask for a quote on each: the difference will come from the model and the insurer far more than from the engine. Five insurers active in Quebec advertise an electric vehicle discount on top of that, of 10 to 20% depending on the insurer as of August 2026; these are advertised maximums, to be checked with your own. It is also why insurance stays outside the wallet calculator: it varies too much from case to case for an average to be honest.

Highway Loss Data Institute, bulletin 33-04, 2016 · Highway Loss Data Institute, bulletin 37-25, 2020 · Thatcham Research, EV Blueprint, 2026 · Mitchell, Plugged-In, Q2 2026 · Ratehub, model-by-model comparison, 2026 · CAA-Québec, insuring an electric vehicle

4. Does an electric vehicle lose its value faster than a combustion vehicle?Complicated: yes, but the figures describe an era that is over.

Complicated: yes, but the figures describe an era that is over. Electric vehicles from 2011 to 2022 absorbed three shocks at once: a technology that kept making them obsolete, manufacturers who slashed their prices, and governments that cut their rebates without notice. None of the three weighs the same way today.

Two eras, not one curve

What changes2011-2022 · volatilitysince 2023 · stabilization
Value retained
Tesla Model 3, US market
51 % after four years (2022 model year)62 % after three years (2023), 66 % after two years (2024)
Technical maturityRange rising fast, air thermal management and optional heat pumps still commonMedian range of 470 km, liquid thermal management throughout, and heat pumps across nearly the whole offering
New-vehicle priceUnilateral manufacturer cuts, up to $15 000 at a strokeOccasional adjustments, no major cut since spring 2023
Provincial rebate$7 000, then $4 000, then two months of suspension$2 000 in 2026, program ending December 31, 2026
Federal rebateUncertainty: $5 000, closed January 12, 2025, then thirteen months with no program at allPredictability: new program since February 16, 2026, trajectory published through 2031

What the first row does not say. Those three rates do not cover the same age, and an older vehicle necessarily loses more. The important point lies elsewhere: the list price of those three model years went from US$46 990 to $42 490 and then $38 990. The 2022 owner is measured against a benchmark that melted by $8 000 under their feet.

The manufacturer did more damage than wear. In January 2023 Tesla cut its Canadian prices overnight: the Model Y went from $85 000 to $69 990. Anyone who had bought six months earlier watched the benchmark value of their vehicle collapse without driving another kilometre. With Tesla dominating the fleet, the drop pulled the whole used market down with it.

Governments went back and forth. Quebec cut Roulez vert from $7 000 to $4 000 on January 1, 2025, then suspended the program for two months: vehicles registered during that window got nothing at all. Ottawa did worse. The announcement of a coming suspension, with no date attached, triggered a rush that emptied the iZEV program envelope in two days, and it took thirteen months for a new federal program to take over.

The rebate distorts the calculation too. Depreciation is measured against the list price, not the price paid. An electric vehicle listed at $45 000, bought for $38 000 after rebates and resold at $20 000, will show 56 % depreciation where its owner actually took 47 %. The more generous the rebate, the harsher the statistic looks. And removing a rebate supports resale value, against intuition: after the US federal credit expired in September 2025, used electric vehicle prices rose 3.5 % while combustion vehicle prices fell 2.0 %.

What decides the rest is perception. A wave of lease returns is arriving, concentrated on the 2023 and 2024 model years. What absorbs that supply depends less on the condition of the vehicles than on what buyers believe about them: non-Tesla electric vehicles were already taking 60.1 days to sell, against 32.4 days for a Tesla, a gap no technical difference explains. What car columnists and everyday conversation carry about electric vehicles therefore weighs directly on that market. A reputation damaged by misinformation is paid for in desirability, and desirability is paid for in resale value.

The other side of depreciation: buying used. The drop the first owner takes is the second owner's discount, and a used electric vehicle adds no manufacturing to the balance sheet: vehicle and battery are already paid for in carbon, only the electricity remains to be counted. On the wallet side, écoconso compared five models over five years at 15 000 km a year with the Brussels Region's cost calculator: the used electric comes out cheaper than the new gasoline version on four of the five, by up to €207 a month for a BMW X1, and that with electricity at €0.33 per kWh, more than four times the Quebec rate. Here the gap can only widen.

What we take from this. The three-to-four-year range offers the best value: the initial drop has been absorbed, and ten years of useful battery life remain. Ask for a state-of-health report, the way you would ask for a history report. If you own an electric vehicle from 2011 to 2022, the loss is already taken: keep it, its battery is doing fine.

Why resale value stays out of the calculator. It is too volatile for an average to be honest in the wallet. But leaving it out does not cut the way people assume: an electric vehicle loses a larger percentage of a higher purchase price, so it can hand back more dollars at resale than a combustion vehicle. Until the item is modelled, nobody can settle it, ourselves included.

Others settle it by convention. Clean Energy Canada applies the same depreciation rate to both powertrains, for lack of a method that commands consensus. It computes that rate on the list price, rebate not deducted. This convention assumes the used market does not take the rebate off the resale price, and it favours the electric vehicle. Yet the end of the US credit, above, shows the opposite: rebates weigh on used prices.

A caveat worth knowing. As with the battery, the available data covers the first cohort. No public source publishes depreciation rates specific to Quebec; Canadian Black Book holds the Canadian data without releasing it. The retention rates cited come from a commercial aggregator monetized through affiliate links, which compiles CarEdge, iSeeCars, Recurrent and KBB for the US market, with a single model year per age point. The price cuts, for their part, are documented in Canadian dollars.

The Charge Port, retention model by model · iSeeCars, 950 000 five-year-old vehicles, 2026 · iSeeCars, the end of the US federal credit · iSeeCars, days to sell in the first quarter of 2026 · RPM, the cut across the whole Tesla range, January 2023 · Quebec.ca, Roulez vert financial assistance · Radio-Canada, the suspension of Roulez vert · Electric Autonomy, the closure of the iZEV program · Transport Canada, the federal program and its trajectory · Recurrent, the wave of lease returns · écoconso, used electric at total cost (in French) · Clean Energy Canada, depreciation by convention, 2026

5. That’s all very well, but I have particular needs that mean I need a combustion vehicleIt all turns on the gap between a need and a desire.

It all turns on the gap between a need and a desire. Three cases hide behind the same objection.

  • The real and frequent need. The offer already covers it: ranges comfortably exceed daily mileage, and a plug at home refills the vehicle overnight. The plug-in hybrid fills a few niche cases, with the reservation set out in question 9.
  • The real but occasional need. Fast chargers cover the long trip; for moving furniture or towing a boat, renting costs less than carrying the oversized vehicle all year.
  • The desire. “But what about the Labrador highway in winter?” The use we picture is not the one we live. A US survey by Strategic Vision shows it: nearly 90% of pickup buyers never use their truck for work, and nearly 40% drive it purely for pleasure at least once a week. What they buy, says the firm’s president, is the self they would like to be: behind the wheel, more confident, more capable, more secure. Psychologist Linda Steg adds social standing: a car also displays one’s position, and advertising plays on power, status and self-esteem. That is one of the reasons advertising regulation is being called for, as the Beyond the vehicle section sets out.

What the figures show

Range is no longer what decides. Natural Resources Canada publishes the range of every model sold in the country. In 2016 the median was 377 km and you could still buy an electric car rated at 100 km; for 2026 models the median reaches 470 km, and the least enduring of the 239 versions on offer manages 227. Against that, people in Quebec drive about 15 000 km a year, or some forty kilometres a day. Recurrent, which tracks more than 18 000 vehicles in real conditions, confirms it from the other end: its drivers use only 8 to 16% of their range in a day.

Buying for the rare case is paid for every day. Oversizing costs on every trip: this tool’s default setting takes 6.8 L/100 km, the rating of a compact sedan, where a real-world SUV often exceeds 9 L and the Quebec fleet average reaches 9.2 L. On the electric side, a large battery is a heavier manufacturing debt; the capacity slider under settings shows the effect directly.

What we take from this. Do the honest count for last year: how many days did you drive beyond the range of an electric vehicle, with no fast charger anywhere along the way? If the answer fits on one hand, size the purchase on ordinary use and rent for the exception. That is not a fallback: it is what frees you to choose a smaller electric vehicle, cheaper to buy, less thirsty, and lighter to manufacture.

Natural Resources Canada, 2026 · Recurrent, 2024 · Miotti and Trancik, Environmental Research Letters, 2026 · Carscoops, the Strategic Vision survey, 2025 · Steg, Transportation Research Part A, 2005

6. What about winter range?Yes, you lose some.

Yes, you lose some. But the battery is not the main culprit. Two thirds of that loss goes to heating a cabin designed to leak heat like a sieve.

And combustion vehicles lose too, which we forget. The US environmental agency puts the cold-weather fuel penalty of a gasoline vehicle at 10 to 30%. The winter penalty is universal in motoring; it is simply more visible when the gauge is a battery read to the kilometre.

What the tests measure

In Canada, 14 to 39% below the official rating. The CAA’s winter drive took fourteen models from Ottawa to Mont-Tremblant at −7 to −15 °C, to a full discharge. On charging, about a hundred kilometres of range recovered in fifteen minutes on a fast charger. Vehicles with a heat pump hold nearly 10 points more.

At −32 °C, not one failed. The NAF’s El Prix test put twenty-four models through the Norwegian deep freeze: an average loss of 38% against WLTP, from 29% for the best to 46% for the last. All of them drove.

These figures do not compare with one another. The CAA measures the gap against Natural Resources Canada ratings, the NAF against WLTP, Recurrent against mild-weather use, and the AAA against 24 °C on a dynamometer. A loss percentage means nothing without its temperature and its reference point.

Why cold costs so much: the cabin, not the battery. A car is barely insulated: thin sheet metal, single glazing, air renewed continuously; a room with the same properties would fail any building code. The combustion engine could live with it, because it wastes most of its fuel as heat: warming you cost it nothing, it simply diverted what it was throwing out through the radiator. The electric motor turns almost everything into motion. It has little waste left to recycle and must manufacture much of its heat, 1.8 to 3.7 kW continuously, taken from the battery. The engineering proof follows: insulating the cabin cuts heating demand by about 20% at 0 °C and nearly 30% at −10 °C.

In this tool, move both sliders, not one. If you raise electric consumption from 16 to 22 kWh/100 km to represent a Quebec winter, raise gasoline from 6.8 to 7.8 L/100 km as well. Moving only the first skews the comparison in favour of combustion. And remember these settings apply to the whole year: winter lasts four to five months here, so the annual average sits between the two seasons.

What we take from this. Winter takes off roughly a third of the advertised range. Four habits win most of it back:

  1. Preheat the cabin and the battery while the vehicle is still plugged in, since that heat then comes from the grid.
  2. Use the heated seats and steering wheel, which warm the person rather than the volume of air.
  3. Choose a model with a heat pump.
  4. Trigger battery preconditioning before a fast charge, without which the charger will deliver only a fraction of its power.

Norway, whose winters are much like ours, registered 98% fully electric vehicles in March 2026. The right question is not whether an electric vehicle gets through winter, but being aware of the range it loses in the cold, particularly when planning long trips.

CAA winter drive · Recurrent, 30 000 vehicles · NAF, El Prix 2026 · AAA, 2026 · US Department of Energy and Argonne · Gellai et al., World Electric Vehicle Journal, 2025 · La Presse, 2025: a winter range figure on the label (in French)

7. I live in an apartment or a condominium: where do I charge?Somewhere other than home, and it is less constraining than it sounds.

Somewhere other than home, and it is less constraining than it sounds. The overnight plug is no longer the only model. Charging moves to wherever the vehicle is already sitting still: at work, at the grocery store, at a neighbourhood charger. Households with no plug at home are known as charging orphans; there are many of them, and they drive.

Five steps, in this order.

  1. First, count what you actually drive. At about forty kilometres a day and 15.3 kWh/100 km (this tool’s default setting), a vehicle uses a little over 6 kWh, more than 8 in winter. The 64 kWh battery taken by default therefore covers seven to ten days depending on the season. You do not need a plug every night: you need a charge every five or six days. That is a weekly logistics constraint, not a daily one, and it is what makes the rest workable.
  2. Look at the block heater outlet. An ordinary 120 V outlet gives back at least fifty or so kilometres a night, according to the Société d’habitation du Québec, which recommends starting from existing outlets. That is more than the forty or so driven each day. In Calgary, over a year of real trips, 120 V charging would have been enough for 29 % of the 129 vehicles followed, and only 18 % would have needed a fast charger twelve or more times a year. Three conditions. The outlet must stay powered, whereas a timer or thermostat often cuts block heater outlets. It should be alone on its circuit, with no extension cord. And the owner or the syndicate must agree, sometimes for a monthly flat fee. Québec.ca warns that this kind of charging may not be enough for a fully electric vehicle: true for those who drive a lot, less so for the average driver.
  3. Look to your workplace. Eight hours parked on a level 2 charger covers several days of driving, often at no cost to the employee. Quebec already counted 9 734 workplace chargers. It is the closest thing to home charging, and the least often explored: ask your employer before doing anything else.
  4. Take the case to your building, with the right programme. The classic mistake is to ask for a charger for yourself. Without enough capacity in the garage, individual chargers end up blocking one another. Écorecharge separately funds the building’s electrical upgrade, up to $120 000 and half of eligible costs, a stream addressed to the owner or the syndicate. That is the one to bring to the general meeting, file in hand.
  5. Write to your municipality. It holds the lever for overnight curbside charging, and it has the money: since 2021, Hydro-Québec has funded up to $12 000 per charger for installations on streets and in municipal lots, with a target of 4 500 chargers by 2028, explicitly meant for neighbourhoods where people cannot charge at home. In Montreal, the modelling reported by the Conseil régional de l’environnement ranges from 2 800 chargers in 2030 if nothing changes to 14 000 if the fleet really does electrify. The gap between those two numbers is a decision, and part of it is taken at city council.

Three brief notes

You are not an isolated case. Natural Resources Canada estimates that at least a third of the Canadian population lives in a multi-unit building or in a dwelling with no driveway or garage. In Quebec, more than three million people live in a multi-unit residential building.

The public network has kept up. More than 9 600 public chargers across about 4 200 sites as of summer 2024, 5 600 of them on the Circuit électrique, a number of fast chargers that more than tripled between 2019 and 2023, and a network judged sufficient at the time for the 270 000 electric vehicles on the road. Those figures can be checked by eye: ChargeHub gathers the networks on a single map, and the shortest way to judge the density is to look up your own street on it.

The fast charger is a top-up. The newest units reach 320 kW and advertise 25 to 30 minutes. A stop of that kind once a week replaces the overnight plug. Making it your daily routine, on the other hand, has a price: frequent use of chargers above 100 kW is associated with more pronounced battery wear, as question 1 explains. If you intend to make it your main method, choose an LFP chemistry: iron phosphate takes fast charging far better than NMC or NCA. In a test published in the Journal of Power Sources in 2025, the harshest regime (more than 90% fast charges, across the full voltage range) required no pack replacement at all on LFP, against three on NMC and twenty on NCA. The cells were passively cooled, so harder used than a real vehicle pack: what counts is the gap between chemistries, not the absolute figure. LFP is, as it happens, the chemistry taken by default in the settings.

What we take from this. Do not try to reproduce the bungalow’s charger: look for the hours when your vehicle is already sitting still, and target those times and places to charge. And if the count still does not add up, in a dense, well-served neighbourhood the best answer may be to own no car at all, which is the subject of question 10.

Radio-Canada, Quebec’s public charging network, 2024 · Natural Resources Canada, charging in multi-unit buildings · Circuit électrique, 320 kW fast charger · Journal of Power Sources, fast charging across chemistries, 2025 · Écorecharge, financial assistance · Hydro-Québec, 4 500 chargers for urban centres · CRE-Montréal, public charging stations, 2024 · ChargeHub, charging station map · Société d’habitation du Québec, 120 V charging (in French) · Fried et al., level 1 charging in Calgary, 2024 · Hydro-Québec, charging in multi-unit buildings (in French) · CAA-Québec, charging on 120 volts, 2026 (in French) · Québec.ca, how to charge

8. Can the grid cope if everyone switches to electric?Yes for the energy, no if everyone plugs in at 6 p.m.

Yes for the energy, no if everyone plugs in at 6 p.m. The objection is a fair one, but it is aimed at the wrong quantity: what is scarce is not the amount of electricity, it is the ability to deliver all of it at once, four hours an evening, in January.

What the numbers say

The energy fits inside existing plans. Electrifying Quebec's roughly 5.1 million passenger vehicles would call for something like 18 TWh a year, a range of 15 to 22 depending on mileage and vehicle size, about 10 % of Hydro-Québec's current sales, and less than a third of the 60 TWh of growth already planned by 2035. Those same vehicles burn 7.3 billion litres of gasoline today, or 65 TWh of chemical energy, most of it dissipated as heat. Electrification does not move demand from one network to another: it removes three quarters of it.

Peak demand, on the other hand, is a real problem. Hydro-Québec filed its own figure with the Régie de l'énergie: of the 9 000 MW of additional capacity planned by 2035, 2 922 MW would come from vehicle charging alone, a third of the capacity added, for a fleet that is still only partly electric. Scaled to the whole fleet, the need would land between 5 and 7 GW, against an all-time record of 43 124 MW on 3 February 2023. And the curves stack instead of cancelling out: Hydro-Québec observes that owners charge mostly between 6 and 8 p.m., exactly when heating can account for as much as 80 % of a household's daily consumption. Charging climbs for the same physical reason that heating is needed.

But that load can be moved, unlike heating. An average vehicle covers about forty kilometres a day, roughly 9 kWh, or 75 minutes on a 7.2 kW home charger. The need takes up 5 % of the day and can wait. The levers are already measured: for the winter of 2024-2025, Hydro-Québec counted on 1 615 MW of load shedding from its business and industrial customers, plus some 330 MW shaved off by households on the Flex D rate or the winter credit, close to 2 000 MW in all, the order of magnitude of a generating station like La Grande-2-A. Bidirectional charging will add to that, and Hydro-Québec is considering it as a peak-management tool.

What we take from this. The question "can the grid hold?" is the wrong one. The right one is "will charging be managed or left free?", and the gap between the two answers runs to thousands of megawatts. A fleet whose charging is shifted by a few hours is an asset to the grid; the same fleet plugged in at 6 p.m. becomes its main source of strain. That said, what electrification asks of the grid is not nil: see the notes on the calculations regarding the treatment of electric infrastructure.

One caveat to keep in mind. The 18 TWh and the 5 to 7 GW are our own calculations, not published figures: Hydro-Québec has released no full-electrification scenario. They rest on an average annual mileage of 15 000 km (whose last reliable Quebec measurement dates from 2009, the Canadian Vehicle Survey having been discontinued since) and on real-world consumption of about 22 kWh/100 km, charging losses and winter included. That figure sits above the 15.3 kWh of the combined rating set under settings, precisely because it is an annual average across an entire fleet, SUVs and pickups included, rather than the rating of a compact sedan. At 13 000 km, the total falls below 16 TWh.

Hydro-Québec, 2035 Action Plan · Radio-Canada: the 2 922 MW of charging filed with the Régie (in French) · Régie de l'énergie, supply plan progress report (in French) · Radio-Canada: the 43 124 MW record (in French) · Hydro-Québec, peak-shaving results history · Flex D rate · Statistique Québec, vehicles on the road (in French) · SAAQ, statistics 1978–2024: 5 085 603 passenger vehicles (in French) · Statistics Canada, Canadian Vehicle Survey · HEC Montréal, Quebec's vehicle fleet (in French)

9. Which plug-in vehicles are sold in Canada?Our recommendation: choose fully electric over plug-in hybrid.

Équiterre maintains a catalogue of every plug-in vehicle sold in Canada, fully electric and plug-in hybrid alike, with their ranges and prices.

Our recommendation: choose fully electric over plug-in hybrid. European data from the ICCT, drawn from the on-board meters of about 8 million new cars, shows that plug-in hybrids emit five times more in real conditions, on average, than their type-approval values. The gap widened from 265 % in 2021 to 400 % in 2023.

And it keeps widening. For the 220 000 plug-in hybrids registered in 2024 that the European Environment Agency tracks, Transport & Environment finds 145 g of CO₂ per kilometre on the road, against 24 g in official tests: six times more, on average. That is barely 14 % less than a conventional gasoline car.

Three causes for that gap. Drivers plug in less often than the test assumes. The combustion engine fires alongside the electric motor rather than leaving it to run alone. And carrying two drivetrains makes the vehicle heavier. The European Commission duly revised its utility factor in 2025, with a further adjustment due in 2027.

The wallet says the same. Clean Energy Canada compared the gasoline Toyota RAV4 with its hybrid and plug-in hybrid versions, and with the electric bZ, over ten years. The bZ saves $26 209 and the conventional hybrid $6 396. The RAV4 plug-in hybrid falls between the two, at $9 610 to $12 011, depending on its electric share, from 40 to 69 %. And it costs $2 760 more than the bZ to buy.

In Quebec the argument carries a local edge: the plug-in hybrid keeps burning imported gasoline where the fully electric vehicle runs on hydroelectricity produced here.

And the conventional hybrid? Not being plug-in, it is a gasoline vehicle that burns less: pick it from the list of gasoline models, a Prius or a Corolla Hybrid for instance. Over its life cycle, a medium-sized conventional hybrid emits 21 % less than its gasoline equivalent, according to a 2022 European analysis.

Catalogue of plug-in vehicles, Équiterre · ICCT, 2026 · Transport & Environment, EEA data, 2026 · Clean Energy Canada, the RAV4 in four powertrains, 2026 · Transport & Environment, hybrid life cycle, 2022

10. Am I an environmentalist if I drive electric?Yes, for a third of the question.

Yes, for a third of the question. Going electric acts on only one of the three levers of mobility, the one this tool measures. The other two are within your reach, and the most important one does not rest on you alone.

Being an environmentalist means knowing that we are part of an Earth system we are throwing off balance, and working with others to keep the world habitable for the living of today and tomorrow, by changing the rules of the game first, not only one's own habits. Changing your vehicle is an individual act. A good one, but an individual act.

The IPCC's sixth assessment report sorts mobility levers by what they act on: the need, the mode or the machine.

  • Avoid: reduce the need to travel, by bringing housing, jobs, schools and services closer together.
  • Shift: change the mode, to walking, cycling or public transit.
  • Improve: make the machine emit less.

This tool measures only the third lever, and it finds it powerful: more than five times fewer emissions over the life of the vehicle, and lower pressure on nine of the ten themes, mineral resources excepted. But this lever removes not one kilometre driven, not one vehicle on the road, not one square metre of city given over to the car. A fully electrified fleet would still exert pressure across every theme.

What the other two levers bring. The greenest car is still the one that is never built: no battery, no oil infrastructure, no kilowatt-hour. Walking, cycling or taking transit erases most of the balance sheet instead of shrinking it, and what each of those modes costs society is priced in The choice of mode, before the choice of vehicle. These modes also give what carbon does not count: active mobility is associated with better cardiovascular health indicators, and going without a vehicle frees up a considerable budget, about $1 310 a month in Montreal according to a study cited by L'actualité, close to $16 000 a year.

A middle ground between owning a vehicle and doing without. The electric-assist bicycle replaces driving alone, not walking or the bus, Équiterre points out; and car sharing makes going without a vehicle realistic where the service exists. It also changes the balance sheet of those who drive little: below 5 000 km a year, and for the same distance travelled, a shared electric vehicle emits up to 89% less over its life cycle than a private one, a shared gasoline vehicle 63% less. It is the lifetime mileage slider seen from the other side: a car that is barely driven never amortises its manufacturing, whereas a shared vehicle spreads it over the kilometres of several households.

What the carbon balance does not capture. Every vehicle, whatever its drivetrain, demands space: on-street and surface parking, garages, widened lanes, minimum parking requirements per dwelling. All of it shapes cities that are more sprawling, more paved and hotter, at the expense of housing, trees and public space. Replacing an engine frees up not one square metre.

What does not rest on you alone. Avoiding and shifting are only within reach where transit, bike lanes and planning make them practical. Those conditions are decided at city council, in the National Assembly and in infrastructure budgets. Being an environmentalist in mobility therefore plays out as much in voting, in public consultation and in support for transit projects as it does at the dealership.

What we take from this. Real change takes all three levers at once: cutting car dependence with the first two, and electrifying 100 % of the fleet that remains. And if a personal vehicle remains indispensable, the electric vehicle clearly beats the combustion vehicle, financially and ecologically, over its whole life.

IPCC, AR6 Working Group III, chapter 5 · Milovanoff et al., Nature Climate Change · Point tournant, episode 6 (in French) · L'actualité, cost of ownership (in French) · La Presse, paying less to get around (in French) · PubMed, active transport and health · Équiterre, electric-assist bicycles (in French) · Nong et al., Transportation Research Part D


Beyond the vehicle

What comes before is measured; what follows is not. Four extensions fall outside the calculator's scope: one economic, one political, a third that sorts the first two into a force field, and a last one that steps outside the vehicle altogether. These are positions held by Pareto, backed by sources, not outputs of the tool.

What gasoline costs the Quebec economy

This tool counts environmental impacts only. One is missing, purely economic but structural in Quebec: every litre of fuel is imported, every kilowatt-hour is produced here.

Quebec extracts no oil. Its refineries process crude from Western Canada and the United States. According to the Chair in Energy Sector Management at HEC Montréal, consumption of petroleum products reached 20.2 billion litres in 2024, up 2.1 %. The transition has not yet bent the curve.

Every dollar spent at the pump largely leaves the Quebec economy, whereas a dollar of electricity stays in it, as Hydro-Québec revenue, royalties and jobs.

There is also a question of reliability and societal robustness. Oil comes from far away, by pipeline and by ship, at the end of a chain exposed to conflict, sanctions, tariffs and the decisions of a few producing countries. Its price follows those shocks: it can move by half in a few months, with nothing Quebec can do about it. Quebec electricity is produced here, its rates are set through a public process and move slowly. Travelling on electricity therefore means trading a volatile, imported expense for a stable, local one, which matters as much for a household budget as for the resilience of an economy.

A case study. Quebec has just weakened its zero-emission vehicle standard, and its own ministry has put numbers on what that does.

Winners and losers of the weakening of Quebec's ZEV standard, 2026 to 2035

Each bar is one actor's net position over the ten years, in billions of dollars discounted to 2025, for this one regulatory decision. All are drawn from the ministry's impact analysis, whose own ledger stops at $17 billion in net cost: the items it counts there are marked. The first bar, hatched, follows from its figures without the document publishing it.

LosersWinners
Crude oil sellersoutside Quebec; the crude and its delivery, everything that is not a margin earned here
+$6.9B
Automakers behind on the standard1 164 000 more gasoline hybrids sold
+$3.4B
Quebec refineriesrefining margin, $1 812.1M
part of the $17B
+$1.8B
Wholesalers and service stationsdistribution margin, $419.8M each
part of the $17B
+$0.8B
Quebec householdsvehicle purchase, fuel, maintenance
part of the $17B
−$10.3B
Climate and health14.7 Mt of GHGs, plus air pollutants
part of the $17B
−$9.4B
Automakers already committed to electrification1 433 000 fewer electric vehicles sold
−$4.2B
Hydro-Québec19 770 GWh not sold
−$2.0B
The ministry's balancethe four lines marked above
−$17.0B
Solid bar: figure published by the ministry Hatched bar: an estimate by Pareto, which the ministry does not publish

The winners are the oil industry and some automakers, at the expense of everyone else in society. The weakening of the standard sells 7.2 billion more litres of gasoline by 2035. Households will pay $9.6 billion for them before taxes, of which $2.7 billion stays in Quebec, in the margins of the two refineries, the wholesalers and the service stations, while $6.9 billion goes to buying the oil and bringing it here, outside Quebec. Automakers that fell behind on the standard take in $3.4 billion more by selling hybrids in place of electrics, while those that had already invested in electrification lose $4.2 billion. On the other side, households lose $10.3 billion once the vehicle purchase and maintenance are counted, climate and health cost $9.4 billion, and Hydro-Québec does not sell 19 770 GWh produced here. The ministry itself puts the balance at $17.0 billion in net cost to society as a whole.

The government says so itself. The notice published in the Gazette officielle du Québec on 23 June 2026, repealing the ban on selling combustion vehicles, announces "benefits for businesses in the oil sector and relief for automakers", then "drawbacks for consumers, who would bear additional energy costs, as well as social costs tied to rising emissions". It is the only source that names automakers among the winners. Not all of them are: the impact analysis describes, without ever quantifying it, the opposite fate of those that had already invested in electrification and counted on reselling their surplus credits.

The oil bar is a deduction, not a ministry figure. The analysis publishes no barrel price: those $6.9 billion are the fuel bill minus the Quebec margins. Per litre, the pre-tax bill comes to $1.33, of which $0.37 is margins earned here and $0.96 goes to the oil and its delivery; at US$100 a barrel, the crude alone is worth $0.87. The 7 215.2 million litres amount to roughly 45 million barrels, or 12 400 barrels a day for ten years. Quebec's two refineries import their crude, mainly from the United States.

Automakers, both lines. The volumes are the 2035 fleet gap between the ministry's two scenarios, 1 433 000 fewer electric vehicles and 1 164 000 more gasoline hybrids (table 3, page 11), which approximates the cumulative sales gap since a light vehicle lasts twelve years and almost nothing sold from 2026 on is scrapped before 2035. Each is valued at the net profit per vehicle of the most profitable electric maker, Tesla at US$2 140, and of the most profitable hybrid maker, Toyota at US$2 104, fiscal 2025 per Nikkei Asia, converted at C$1.38 to US$1.

Climate and health. The social cost of carbon and of air pollutants.

Hydro-Québec. Its lost sales are revenue, not profit, and the same $2.0 billion shows up in the ministry's ledger as a saving for households.

Taxes are not shown here. The household figure is the ministry's, which excludes the excise tax, the fuel tax and the GST and QST. At the pump, households therefore pay more, and the two levels of government collect close to 29 cents on every extra litre sold, roughly $2.1 billion over ten years, an estimate by Pareto.

Regulatory impact analysis of the ZEV standard easing, Quebec ministry of the Environment (in French) · Gazette officielle du Québec, 23 June 2026 (in French) · Journal de Montréal (in French) · La Presse, column by Francis Vailles (in French) · Carscoops, automakers' profit per vehicle, fiscal 2025 · État de l'énergie au Québec 2026, HEC Montréal (in French)

What is missing on the policy side

New combustion vehicles should no longer be sold. Every combustion vehicle sold today will run for fifteen years and burn gasoline until 2041. None of the measures below solves the problem on its own. The first three name the act for what it is (a fifteen-year emissions commitment) at the precise moment it is made; the fourth acts upstream, on what manufacturers are required to bring to market; the fifth acts downstream, on what becomes of the battery; the sixth opens the way out to households that cannot afford it.

  • A symbolic surcharge on the purchase of a new combustion vehicle. The amount matters less than the signal sent at the moment of signing. Quebec already has the lever: the additional registration fee hits vehicles of 4 litres of displacement or more, from $36.75 to $161 a year. The criterion is obsolete, displacement having ceased to be a good indicator of consumption since small turbocharged engines became the norm. Basing that surcharge on the model year's fuel consumption rating, which Natural Resources Canada already publishes for every vehicle sold, would make it both fair and legible.
  • A mandatory statement on the bill of sale and in advertising, on the model of the warnings printed on cigarette packs. France has required it since 1 March 2022: every motor vehicle advertisement must carry a message in favour of active or shared mobility, along with the emissions class label, from A to G. Équiterre has been asking for the same here since June 2024: a Canadian automotive advertising code that would make disclosure of environmental effects and safety risks mandatory, explicitly modelled on tobacco regulation. For now the industry self-regulates.
  • A ban on advertising for vehicles that burn gasoline. France passed one in its climate and resilience act: from 1 January 2028, no advertising at all for a passenger car emitting more than 123 g of CO₂ per kilometre. Several cities go further and target all fossil-fuel vehicle advertising. Amsterdam has banned it since 1 May 2026 across all of its public spaces, transit included, making it the first capital to write it into its bylaws. Edinburgh did so back in May 2024 on the advertising space it owns, SUVs included. In Quebec, Équiterre is calling for a full ban on gasoline vehicle advertising by 2030, five years before the 2035 deadline then set for the end of their sale.
  • Strengthen the zero-emission vehicle standard rather than dismantle it. It is the standard, not the purchase rebate, that sets the share of electric vehicles each manufacturer must bring to market.

    The dismantling under way. Quebec has been dismantling the standard in stages since 2025, at the explicit request of manufacturers who did not keep up with the market. Ottawa is on the same path and is repealing its electric vehicle sales mandate, which required 20 % of sales this year and 100 % in 2035, with the stricter emissions standard promised in its place not even out for consultation.

  • A battery regulation on the European model. Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 requires a digital passport for every electric vehicle battery from 18 February 2027, a verified declaration of its carbon footprint, then minimum recycled content from 18 August 2031: 16 % of the cobalt, 6 % of the lithium and 6 % of the nickel, rising to 26, 12 and 15 % in 2036; recyclers will have to recover 50 % of the lithium by the end of 2027 and 80 % by the end of 2031.

    Nothing of the kind here. Quebec removed electric vehicle batteries from its extended producer responsibility in June 2022, at the industry's request, in favour of a voluntary recovery programme, and no federal rule requires recycled content or a passport. The “recycled cathode” setting in this tool therefore describes a supply chain that European law is building and that ours leaves to the market.

  • Social leasing of electric vehicles for lower-income households. France is renewing its scheme in 2026: a household whose taxable income does not exceed €16 880 per share, and which needs its car to work, meaning a commute of more than 10 km or 8 000 km a year for work, leases a new electric car for under €200 a month, excluding insurance and options, with no down payment and for at least three years. The edition that opened on 16 July 2026 targets at least 50 000 households.

    A possible version here. Quebec could adapt the formula for those who remain stuck with an old gasoline car for lack of means, especially in the regions, where transit falls short. The Electrification and Climate Change Fund exists for exactly this kind of way out, alongside regional transit and carpooling.

    What not to do. Social leasing is the opposite of a gasoline tax cut, which helps in proportion to the litres bought: the more you burn, the more you get. A note by economist Dario Tortarolo, published by the World Bank in May 2026, points out that such cuts mostly benefit better-off households, who consume more, that they are hard to withdraw once granted, and that support is better aimed at people than at the product.

The bonus-malus, an unavoidable solution, Roulez électrique (in French) · Équiterre wants to apply "the same recipe" as tobacco, La Presse (in French) · Amsterdam, fossil advertising ban · Edinburgh, ban on SUV and airline ads · Rules on motor vehicle advertising, French ministry for the Ecological Transition (in French) · Advertising and vehicles: obligations and prohibitions, service-public.fr (in French) · ZEV standard, Quebec ministry of the Environment (in French) · Le Devoir, repeal of the federal sales mandate (in French) · Gazette officielle du Québec, draft regulation repealing the 2034-2035 prohibitions (in French) · Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 on batteries, EUR-Lex · EV batteries removed from extended producer responsibility, Quebec, 2022 (in French) · Social leasing 2026, French ministry for the Ecological Transition (in French) · Social leasing of electric cars, service-public.fr (in French) · Tortarolo, tax cuts and the 2026 oil shock, World Bank

What pushes and what holds back: a force field analysis

Changing an industry is never only a matter of technology: it moves revenues, jobs and habits, and those who stand to lose defend themselves. It is a balance of power, hence a political matter. Kurt Lewin proposed in 1951 a simple way to read it, the force field: on one side what pushes toward the electric vehicle, on the other what holds the status quo in place, each force weighed. Here, factors weigh without meaning to; actors weigh on purpose, and they are what a policy acts on.

Force field of electric vehicle adoption in Québec, September 2026

Each arrow is the weight Pareto gives a force, from 1 to 5, on the strength of the source cited beneath it: a judgment, not a measurement. The arrows push against the middle axis, the state of the market in 2026, driving forces to the right, restraining forces to the left. The factors are sorted into the four families the adoption literature uses, and each band carries its own sum, the circled figure being the one that prevails, except at a tie, where neither is: that is where the imbalance reads, better than in the total. One force is an exception to the scale: the oil chain keeps an arrow of 5 but counts 15 in the sums, because it acts mostly through the other restraining forces.

Driving forcesRestraining forces
Techno-economic factorsthe price of the car, the energy and the battery · IEA, Nykvist and Nilsson11 against 9
  1. Running cost5Gasoline around $1.90 a litre in September 2026 according to the Régie de l’énergie, electricity at 10.5¢ a kilowatt-hour: fuel savings motivate 89% of prospective buyers. AutoHebdo 2026 survey (very high confidence)
  2. The battery cost curve4Battery packs fell to US$108 a kilowatt-hour in 2025, 8% below 2024; a fully electric vehicle’s pack sells for $99, and lithium iron phosphate for $81 against $128 for nickel manganese cobalt. That curve lowers the purchase price more reliably than incentives do, and no Québec decision reaches it. BloombergNEF (high confidence)
  3. Chinese electric vehicles2A quota of 49 000 a year at a 6.1% tariff since March 1, 2026, about 3% of the market; 53% of prospective buyers would consider a Chinese brand. Radio-Canada (medium confidence)
  1. A market turned toward SUVs and trucks586% of sales in 2024, against 24% in 1990, and a record $25.9 billion spent on new vehicles: small affordable models are missing on both sides. It is the force that commands the others, since mass decides battery size, hence minerals and price: 96.5 kWh on average across the 130 fully electric models in the catalogue here, all categories together, against 53.4 kWh for the medium segment sold in the European Union in 2023. State of Energy in Québec 2026 · ICCT (very high confidence)
  2. The second-hand market2Most households do not buy new: across Europe eight buyers in ten take a used car, nine in ten among low and middle incomes. But a used electric car is a new sale from three or four years earlier: the 2029 market is being decided today, and Québec is not selling enough to fill it, 42 064 in 2025 against 102 819 in 2024. IEA, Global EV Outlook 2026 · AutoMédia (medium confidence)
  3. The purchase price259% of prospective buyers in Québec cannot afford an electric vehicle without an incentive. The ministry publishes its own price-parity matrix, and it depends on the segment: an electric car with 320 km of range reaches the price of a gasoline one in 2027, one with 640 km in 2047; a light truck with 320 km in 2032, one with 640 km after 2050. Québec buys the far corner of that table. AutoHebdo 2026 survey · Impact analysis (high confidence)
Spatial and infrastructure factorswhere you park, where you plug in, what the grid can take · Barla et al., Pamidimukkala et al.5 against 5
  1. Clean, cheap, local electricity5Every kilowatt-hour stays in Québec, at 34.5 g CO₂e, and its price depends on no world market: 7.065¢ for the first 40 kilowatt-hours a day and 11.142¢ beyond, Rate D as of April 1, 2026, while gasoline follows the barrel. Protecting the environment motivates 55% of prospective buyers. AutoHebdo 2026 survey · 2026 rate schedule (very high confidence)
  1. Left without a plug3About 3.2 million Quebecers live in a multi-unit building and “very few of them currently have access to charging,” while at least 80% of charging happens at home. It is the first measured determinant: across 410 Québec zones from 2012 to 2018, raising the share of detached houses from 48% to 68% lifts the adoption rate from 1.44% to 4.3%, accounting for 38% of the gap between zones, and the effect grows over time. New construction has been settled since March 26, 2026; the 350 000 spaces to retrofit in existing buildings are under no obligation, and the government still expects 145 000 owners without home charging in 2030. A dense public network softens the constraint, as ChargeHub’s map shows street by street, which is why this force weighs only 2. Québec charging strategy · Barla et al. (high confidence)
  2. Charging is steered nowhere2In 2025, Hydro-Québec’s smart appliance offer shaved 306 MW off the peak: thermostats and water heaters, not one car. In the Québec charging strategy, energy management through connected chargers and bidirectional charging pilots carry no budget line, against $506.9 million for the deployment axis. The most easily shifted appliance in the house is the only one nobody shifts. Hydro-Québec · Québec charging strategy (medium confidence)
Institutional and regulatory factorswhat the rule requires, taxes or exempts · Ryghaug and Skjølsvold, Geels et al.10 against 5
  1. The ZEV standard, even weakened4Cut to 80% of credits in 2035, it remains the only constraint on what automakers bring to market. The ministry’s impact analysis (high confidence)
  2. Pre-wiring new buildings2Since March 26, 2026, every residential building of five units or more must carry charging infrastructure for each resident parking space; buildings of four units or fewer have been covered since 2018. The cost is 0.2 to 0.6% of construction, or $200 to $800 a unit. It is the only measure that settles the problem in advance rather than after the fact, and the only one still working in fifty years. Roulez électrique (high confidence)
  3. The GHG reduction targets and their roadmap2Québec is aiming for 37.5% below the 1990 level, then carbon neutrality in 2050. Road transport alone accounts for 34% of the province’s emissions in 2023: neither target holds without the vehicle fleet, and that is where the ZEV standard, the incentives and the charging support get their mandate, funded at $8.2 billion over five years by the 2026-2031 implementation plan. Two caveats explain the weight of 3. The deadline slipped from 2030 to 2035 on January 22, 2026, five more years without the percentage moving. And the same plan puts its own trajectory at 32.1% in 2035, below the 37.5% it promises: the roadmap does not reach the target, and it is the government that writes so. A target obliges no one to buy; it obliges someone to write the rules that do. 2030 Plan for a Green Economy (in French) · Deadline pushed back (in French) · 2026-2031 implementation plan (in French) (medium confidence)
  4. Purchase incentives2The federal one returned in February 2026, up to $5 000; Roulez vert, cut since 2025, ends on December 31, 2026. Their 2025 withdrawal measured their weight: 42 064 electric vehicles sold, 59% fewer than in 2024. Transport Canada · AutoMédia (medium confidence)
  1. The road is paid for by gasoline4The 19.2¢-a-litre tax is the main revenue of the fund that repairs the roads: $2 158 million expected in 2024-2025, down from the 2016-2017 peak of $2 336 million, and users already covered only 57% of that fund’s spending in 2023. Every litre not sold widens the hole, which gives the finance department a permanent, silent reason not to hurry; its first answer was to bill electric vehicle owners, $125 a year starting in 2027. Research Chair in Taxation and Public Finance · Distance-based charge · Radio-Canada (very high confidence)
  2. No obligation to recycle the battery1RECYC-QUÉBEC states it plainly: “all road vehicle batteries […] are excluded” from extended producer responsibility, from which Québec removed them in June 2022. Europe does the opposite: from August 18, 2031, an electric vehicle battery must contain at least 16% recycled cobalt, 6% lithium and 6% nickel in its active materials, then 26, 12 and 15% in 2036. That is the path by which mining pressure falls over time, and nothing here opens it. RECYC-QUÉBEC · Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 (very high confidence)
Psychosocial and cultural factorswhat you see in the next driveway, and what people tell each other · Axsen and Kurani, Tebbe10 against 9
  1. High satisfaction with electric vehicles5Silence, instant torque, charging at home. In the 2024 worldwide survey of 23 000 drivers, 92% would buy electric again and 1% would return to gasoline; in Canada, 85% of the 16 041 owners surveyed will probably or very probably choose another electric; in the United Kingdom, nine in ten would not go back. Global EV Alliance · CAA-Québec · ECIU (very high confidence)
  2. Neighbourhood contagion3One more electric car within 125 metres leads to 0.22 more purchases the following quarter, an effect measured on Sweden’s complete registration registry, and it does not wear off. It is the fastest loop in the field, one quarter, but it is neutral: the same mechanism spreads whatever is already parked in the driveways, and in Québec those are light trucks. Tebbe, Swedish registry (high confidence)
  3. Concern for the environment and the air we breathe2More than 74% of Quebecers say they are concerned about air quality, urban smog and forest fire smoke, and close to 70% have felt the effects of extreme heat on their health in the past five years, according to a Léger survey of September 2025. That worry shows up in the buyer: protecting the environment motivates 55% of prospective buyers, according to the 2026 AutoHebdo survey.

    Why a weight of 2. It comes from what that same survey also measures, fuel savings motivating 89%: the concern is real and held by a majority, but it comes behind the wallet, and it is the wallet that signs. CIRANO measures it on the same ground: among 1 377 Canadian owners, environmental identity is the weakest of the predictors of the intention to buy an SUV, −0.052, when already owning one weighs 0.391, see the advertising note opposite.

    A factor, not an actor. Not to be confused with “Public health” among the actors: there, organisations that weigh on purpose; here, a diffuse worry that weighs without meaning to. ASPQ, December 2025 brief (in French) · AutoHebdo 2026 survey (in French) (low confidence)
  1. Advertising, 79% for light trucks5Of 132 Canadian ads from 2019-2020, 79% show light trucks and 68% tie them to nature; the industry spends at least $446 million a year on them and ranks first in digital advertising. It does not work alone: among 1 377 Canadian owners, what best predicts the intention to buy an SUV is already owning one, 0.391, then the neighbourhood norm, 0.310, then media influence, 0.140, while environmental identity weighs only −0.052. Advertising pushes with the contagion, not against it. Équiterre · CIRANO (very high confidence)
  2. Unfamiliarity, as with any new technology2Rogers explains the pace at which a technology spreads by five perceived attributes: relative advantage, compatibility with existing habits, complexity, trialability and observability. The electric vehicle scores well on two, running-cost advantage and visibility, and badly on three. It forces a rethink of refuelling, range falling 14 to 39% at −7 to −15 °C in the CAA test on 14 vehicles between Ottawa and Mont-Tremblant. It cannot be tried in ten minutes, which is why Natural Resources Canada funds test drives against “low confidence and awareness” about charging. And it arrives with a new vocabulary: kilowatt-hours, charging levels, degradation. None of this is peculiar to it: it is the learning cost of any new technology, and it is paid once. Rogers · CAA · NRCan (medium confidence)
  3. Social norms, from petro-masculinity to carbon populism2A big vehicle is not only a purchase, it is a sign. Daggett coined petro-masculinity for the way fossil energy makes identities, and why defending the engine comes to mean defending an order; Lockwood traces the channels through which right-wing populism attaches itself to hostility toward climate policy, the tax first, the experts next. In Québec, “Mon char, mon choix” is the slogan. But the only Canadian measurement available does not show the expected gap: among 1 377 owners, the intention to buy an SUV is slightly higher among women than men, 4.86 against 4.61 out of 7, safety being the reason, and the intention to buy an electric vehicle slightly higher among men, 3.96 against 3.64. The norm works in the discourse more than on the order form, which is why it weighs 2. Daggett (2018) · Lockwood (2018) · CIRANO (very low confidence)
Actorsthose who weigh on purpose, and whom a policy can target14 against 32
  1. Hydro-Québec3Every litre displaced is a kilowatt-hour sold: the table Hydro-Québec filed with the Régie de l’énergie puts the power charging will call for in 2035 at 2 922 MW, a third of all the power being added, and the Electric Circuit installs the chargers. Radio-Canada · 2035 Action Plan (high confidence)
  2. Environmental movements3The RNCREQ, in July 2026: keep the 100% target for 2035 and lock it in, remove non-plug-in hybrids, ban gasoline vehicle advertising; AVÉQ, Équiterre and Electric Mobility Canada hold the same line, without an industry’s weight behind them. Same caveat as public health: “the transition cannot rest on the electrification of individual vehicles alone.” RNCREQ · Roulez électrique (high confidence)
  3. Scientists and energy experts3The IPCC holds it established that a battery vehicle emits less than a combustion one over its life cycle as soon as the electricity is low-carbon, and that electrification plays the key role in land transport; the Canadian Climate Institute calls for standards strong enough to deliver the promised deployment. The caveat, from Pineau as from the IPCC: reduce and shift first, electrify next. IPCC · Canadian Climate Institute · Pineau (high confidence)
  4. Public health3Eight health organizations, among them the Lung Association, the physicians for the environment and the Canadian Public Health Association, welcomed the federal standard in December 2023: up to 11 000 premature deaths avoided and more than $90 billion in health benefits over 25 years, according to the federal analysis. In Montréal, 45% of fine particles come from transport. The caveat: public health asks first for fewer cars, transit and active travel. The Atmospheric Fund · Montréal public health (very high confidence)
  5. Automakers that bet on electric2Tesla, the only one of fifteen major automakers whose lobbying follows the science according to InfluenceMap, and the Chinese brands arriving through the quota; the weakened standard costs them $4.2 billion, see Winners and losers. InfluenceMap (medium confidence)
  1. The oil chain×3 regulatory capture15Weighted 5 like the others, counted 5 × 3. The only force on the chart to carry a multiplier, because it acts mostly through the others.

    The vocabulary. The three arguments it has pushed since 1967, free choice, affordability, the solution that does not work, have become the vocabulary of the parties, the dealers, the advertising and the columnists that follow it down this column.

    The borrowed voice. Nyberg et al. name the mechanism on the Australian case: a fossil fuel industry speaks in the name of the people, which only elected officials may do, and that borrowed voice legitimises its political action.

    The count. Imperial Oil and the Canadian Fuels Association against the federal mandate from 2023 on, withdrawn in February 2026 after ten months that InfluenceMap describes as a near-complete rewrite of climate policy; 1 135 federal lobbying meetings in 2024; $6.9 billion of oil at stake over ten years for the weakened standard alone, see Winners and losers. InfluenceMap · Environmental Defence · Nyberg et al. (2026) (high confidence)
  2. Recalcitrant automakers and their association5Fourteen of fifteen major automakers lobbied against at least one pro-EV policy; the CVMA opposed Québec’s ZEV standard in June 2026 and the federal mandate in December 2025, while calling for incentives and chargers. InfluenceMap · LobbyMap (very high confidence)
  3. Parties campaigning against electrification4“Free choice,” promises Poilievre as he pledges to scrap the federal mandate; “a clear victory for Albertans,” says Smith when Ottawa backs down; Ford’s Ontario cancelled its rebate in 2018 and saw sales fall by half; in Québec, the PCQ runs “Mon char, mon choix” and calls the targets “utopian and dangerous.” The vocabulary is the one the oil lobby has used since 1967. NOW · Alberta · The Narwhal · La Nouvelle Union · InfluenceMap (very high confidence)
  4. Dealers4Their weight is not their revenue but their address: about 890 outlets, 99% of the network and 45 000 direct jobs, in nearly every riding. In February 2024, 47% of the 4 240 Canadian dealerships surveyed had no zero-emission vehicle in stock; the CCAQ asks that Québec’s 2026 target be halved, and CADA applauds the end of the federal mandate while calling for incentives. Transport Canada, Dunsky survey · CCAQ · CADA · CCAQ (very high confidence)
  5. Governments that adopt the lobbies’ language2Québec weakens its standard for the second time in three years, from 100% to 80% of credits in 2035, non-plug-in hybrids admitted until 2027: “we had to ease it,” says the minister, who invokes “the challenges facing the auto industry” and supply problems in the regions, arguments the three industry associations promptly extended by calling the revised targets “still too ambitious”; Ottawa repeals its own; Roulez vert winds down; and on June 17, 2026, the requirement to pre-wire new buildings is pushed back a year. Radio-Canada · Impact analysis · Le Devoir · La Voix de l’Est (high confidence)
  6. The media and columnists’ story2“Electric vehicles are not selling anymore”: in the British press, one article in four carries at least one misleading claim and negative framing prevails, 38% to 26%; in four countries, more people believe the myths, fires, no emission savings, than reject them; on fire, the count has in fact been made, 393 verified cases worldwide from 2010 to June 2023 across some 30 million electric vehicles, against a 0.1% risk recorded for gasoline and diesel.

    The mechanism. The method has a name in marketing, FUD, for fear, uncertainty and doubt: it is not a matter of showing that the product is bad, only of keeping enough worry alive that the purchase is put off, and a delay is enough.

    Whom it serves. In Quebec, the 2025 drop stems first from the withdrawal of subsidies, but the story serves those the status quo suits: Geels’s discursive power. ECIU · Nature Energy · Geels (2014) · The Conversation (medium confidence)
Sum of weights: 5060

The factors lean toward electric, 36 to 28; it is the actors that hold back, 14 to 32.

On the factor side, purchase intent is rising: 44% of Quebec buyers now say their next vehicle will be electric, against 36% the year before.

On the actor side, the rule is retreating: Québec weakens its standard for the second time in three years and Ottawa repeals its own, borrowing the industry’s arguments.

Driving force, pushes toward the electric vehicle Restraining force, holds the status quo in place ×3Multiplier: a force that acts through the others, arrow on the scale of 5, counted 15 A weight assigned by Pareto, never a measurement

How the weights are assigned. The weight shown is the product of reach and grip, mapped onto 1 to 5; a force that acts only on purchases still to come loses a point.

What is markedWhat it measuresHow it is counted
Reach
1 to 3
The share of purchase decisions the force touches. Narrow below 10 % of sales; partial for a share identifiable by housing, income or territory; general when no buyer can avoid it.
Grip
1 to 3
How far it moves the decisions it touches. Of the five perceived attributes that govern how fast a technology is adopted, according to Rogers: one attribute for a marginal force, four or five for a decisive one. For an actor, what is counted instead is the four powers of Geels: instrumental, discursive, material and institutional.
Confidence
five levels
What is known about the force, never its strength. It closes each note. How robust the evidence is, crossed with how far the sources agree, as the IPCC has done since 2010. It changes no weight and enters no sum: a force can be small and certain, or weighed without being well established.

The weights remain judgements by Pareto resting on the sources cited, not measurements: the rubric makes them repeatable, not objective.

Lewin’s lesson: removing a restraint beats pushing harder. Pushing awakens resistance; lifting a restraint awakens nothing. Subsidies push, and 2025 showed what it costs when they stop. The ZEV standard, the malus, the mention on the contract and the advertising ban lift restraints: that is the point of the previous extension. Two of the restraining forces are revenues that pay for their own defence, the oil chain’s margin per litre and the tax that repairs the roads; no driving force has that, and the purchase incentive has to be voted every year. What Lewin calls a force field, transitions research calls a regime change: incumbents resist through four kinds of power, instrumental, discursive, material and institutional (Geels, 2014), and acceleration comes from coalitions that get around them (Roberts et al., 2018), which Berkeley et al. (2017) applied to the electric vehicle. One last feature: automakers and dealers sit on both sides of the axis, against mandates, for subsidies.

Misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation is a falsehood repeated in good faith; disinformation, a falsehood made up knowingly, to serve an interest. The first is a factor: in four countries, more people believe that electric vehicles catch fire more often, or save no greenhouse gas, than reject it; what predicts that belief is not education but a conspiracy mindset, and a plain fact sheet pushes it back, still ten days later (Nature Energy, 2025).

The second is an actor: the AFPM’s eight-figure campaign against the American standards (AFPM) and fifty years of identical arguments from the oil lobby, free choice, affordability, the solution that does not work (InfluenceMap). The two meet when parties and columnists repeat those arguments without knowing where they come from: one side’s disinformation becomes the other’s misinformation. This comparison’s answer: a source behind every figure.

The choice of mode, before the choice of vehicle

This tool compares two vehicles. It does not compare a vehicle with the trip that could have been made another way, and that is where the gap is widest. A HEC Montréal study by Gabrielle Beaudin, Muriel Julien and David Benatia, June 2024, prices the four travel modes of the Montréal agglomeration, private, public and external costs included.

Its finding: the gap between modes runs in multiples. A year of commuting comes to $15 250 by car, everything included, against $7 450 by public transit, $2 400 by bicycle and $2 050 on foot. The composition differs as much as the amount: close to two thirds of the motorist's bill is paid by other people, whereas for cycling and walking society recovers more than it spends, through the years of life that physical activity returns to it.

The annual cost of commuting by mode, Montréal agglomeration

Two readings of the same bill: what a year of travel costs one person who travels that way, then what it costs the whole agglomeration. Each bar breaks into nine items in three shades: what the user pays out of pocket, what public budgets pay on their behalf, and what society carries with no budget recording it. The table below the graph says what each item covers.

Car
Electric car
Public transit
Cycling
Walking

Left of the axis: a negative item, that is what the mode returns to society Right of it: nine items in three families, private cost light, public cost in the middle, external cost dark
ItemCategoryWhat it covers
Purchase, use and fees private cost Buying and running the vehicle or the fares, fuel, maintenance, parking, licence, registration, the insurance contribution and fines.Hatched on the electric car row, where its value is a Pareto estimate.
Travel time private cost The time spent travelling, valued at half the metropolitan median hourly wage. It is the largest item for every mode but the car.
Infrastructure and operations public cost Building and maintaining roads, sidewalks and bike lanes across the three levels of government, and running the transit agencies.
Snow clearing public cost Clearing snow from roadway, sidewalks and bike paths, which the study counts apart from the infrastructure budgets.
Greenhouse gases and pollutants external cost The greenhouse gases and air pollutants of combustion, valued at $473 a tonne, 98 % greenhouse gases and 2 % pollutants. Outside traffic jams: what congestion adds is counted in the next item.Hatched on the electric car row, where its value is a Pareto estimate.
Congestion external cost The time lost in traffic, the extra wear and fuel, and the emissions they add: for a motorist, $1 501, $328 and $224 a year.Hatched on the electric car row, where its value is a Pareto estimate.
Collisions external cost The lost production from deaths and injuries, human capital method. Cycling and walking carry only 5 % of it: collisions come first from vehicles.
Space occupied external cost The rental value of the land taken by roadway, sidewalks, bike lanes and off-street parking, the last of these alone worth $145M a year.
Health benefit external cost The deaths avoided through physical activity: 11 a year per 100 000 people for each kilometre walked daily, 5.9 by bicycle. It is the only item that can turn negative, and transit riders get their share, walking 1.56 km a day to reach their stop.
How the electric-car line is built: a Pareto assumption that touches three items out of nine

The electric car is not in the study: it is a hypothesis, and it touches three items out of nine. The greenhouse gas and pollutant item does not disappear, it drops to a thirtieth: at this tool's default settings an electric car emits 3.4 % of what a gasoline vehicle emits on the road, and the share of emissions congestion carries follows the same ratio. That is $538M less, the wear particles from tyres and road staying outside the count, the study pricing them for no mode. The item then weighs 0.15 % of the bar, under one pixel: it is drawn there at its floor, four pixels, and the reading line gives its exact value.

Purchase and fees. This item loses what this tool's wallet calculator returns at its default settings, $0.13 a kilometre over the 16 500 km of a year: $1 341M less, the whole gain of the vehicle carried here where the study charges commuting with only a share of its kilometres. Nothing moves in the public cost, in collisions, the space occupied or travel time. With the greenhouse gas item, the total falls by 20 %, and driving still costs more than five times cycling.

The source of the nine items. They come from the calculation workbook published with the study, which details sixteen of them by mode and by category where Figure 3 of the report publishes only the three totals.

Four cautions. The workbook gives the cost per person: the agglomeration amount follows from multiplying it by the number of users of the mode, and the check is that those numbers recover the modal shares of Table A-5.1, 45.8 % for the car and 38.6 % for public transit. Grouping into nine leaves nothing out: each category closes back on the Figure 3 totals. An item too thin to be seen is drawn at four pixels, and those pixels are taken from the largest item of the same bar, so the bar keeps its exact length. And the axis is off-centre, 14 % of the track for benefits, but both sides stay on one scale.

  • What dominates the cost of the car is not fuel, it is infrastructure. The road network is its largest item, $4 863 per motorist a year, split between public budgets, snow clearing included, and the land taken by roads and parking, none of which the motorist pays for directly. Then come buying and running the vehicle, travel time, congestion and collisions. Greenhouse gases and pollutants close the list, under 5 % of the total, and they are still the only item a change of powertrain divides by thirty: that is what the second bar of the graph measures.
  • Space counts too. Parking lots on the island alone, excluding on-street parking and parking inside buildings, are worth $145 million a year in ground rent and cover more than 7.3 km². This is FAQ 10, with a number on it: replacing an engine frees up not one square metre.
  • What tips cycling and walking onto the benefit side is health, not the absence of emissions: $487 million a year of deaths avoided for the agglomeration.
Three other studies: $68 billion a year in Quebec, 3.2 times more value created by public transit, and an economy that grows when people drive less

According to another study, car transport costs Quebecers about $68 billion a year, in 2026 dollars. Its direct spending alone is equivalent to close to $28 000 a year for a family of two adults and two children.

And that spending is still growing, according to the Trajectoire Québec and David Suzuki Foundation study. It rose 33 % in constant dollars from 1995 to 2015, faster than the population.

Where do these figures come from?
The study covers 2015, in that year's dollars. It puts the cost at $51 billion a year: $43.5 billion of household and government spending, and $7.6 billion of external costs, namely accidents, congestion, pollution, GHGs and noise. The direct spending is equivalent to more than $20 000 per family of four, or $5 271 per person. Public transit, freight and parking are excluded. Nothing suggests, the study concludes, that the rise will reverse without a change of policy. To convert to 2026 dollars, Pareto applies Quebec's consumer price index, which rose 32 % between the 2015 average and that of the first eight months of 2026. Trajectoire Québec and David Suzuki Foundation (in French) · Le Journal de Québec, 2018 (in French) · Statistics Canada, table 18-10-0004-01

A third study follows each dollar spent. According to the Montreal Metropolitan Community, $100 million spent on public transit creates 3.2 times more value added in Quebec than the same amount spent on cars. It also supports 2.5 times more jobs there.

The car sends money out of Quebec. Of $100 million spent on it, $57 million leaves as imports, against $15 million for public transit. Going electric would keep only part of it, by the same figures: the vehicle itself makes up 63 % of Quebec's international car-related imports, fuel about a quarter.

Where do these figures come from?
The study, published in August 2026 with the Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal, rests on simulations by the Institut de la statistique du Québec, run with its input-output model, in 2025 dollars and without induced effects. Each scenario splits $100 million the way Quebec households spend: for cars, 52 % on buying new or used vehicles and 21 % on fuel. Value added is $27 million for cars, $57 million for other household spending and $85 million for public transit. Jobs, 231, 439 and 579 person-years. Imports, $57, $34 and $15 million. Quebec's international car-related imports, about $30 billion a year, comprise $18.8 billion of vehicles, $7.4 billion of fuels and $3.6 billion of parts (figure 3). The ISQ states that it neither analyses nor interprets these results, and that this is not a cost-benefit analysis. The study argues for stable funding of public transit. Montreal Metropolitan Community, 2026 (in French)

Driving less cuts emissions and grows the economy. That is the conclusion of a fourth study, by researchers from HEC Montréal, the Université de Sherbrooke and Quebec's Ministry of the Environment. It simulates a Quebec where 20 % fewer kilometres are driven by car.

Money that no longer goes into the car stays in Quebec. Households buy fewer vehicles and less gasoline, largely imported, and spend more on local goods and services. After a slight dip at first, the economy grows a little faster. Cutting car use before electrifying also makes the transition cheaper: that is the order of Avoid, Shift, Improve in FAQ 10.

Where do these figures come from?
The study appeared in 2026 in Sustainability Science and Technology, and its authors summarize it in Le Climatoscope. It combines two models: one of the energy system, the other of Quebec's economy, which accounts for prices. Compared with the same Quebec without this drop in car use, gross domestic product (GDP) is 0.08 % lower in 2025, then 0.21 % higher in 2030 and 0.19 % higher in 2050. The energy system costs 2 to 4 % less. Gasoline imports fall by nearly 16 % in 2025. The climate gain is largest today, while cars still run mostly on gasoline. It shrinks as the fleet electrifies: by 2050, driving less mainly avoids electricity, which frees up generating capacity. The 20 % is an assumption: the study does not say what measures would get there, whether remote work, carpooling or public transit. Le Climatoscope, 2026 (in French) · Pedinotti-Castelle et al., Sustainability Science and Technology, 2026

The lever measured by the HEC Montréal study: at least 40 % of car trips could shift without sacrifice, namely trips of 10 km or less where walking, cycling or public transit costs neither more money nor more than five extra minutes than a car in congestion. A driver who shifts saves $3 530 a year and avoids $10 130 in social costs. For the agglomeration that shift would be worth $1.7 billion and 21 % of commuting emissions; for Quebec, 1 to 2 Mt CO₂e and roughly $12 billion.

What this changes here. Nothing above is contradicted: when a vehicle is necessary, electric remains clearly the better choice. But the wallet receipt and the carbon balance are read inside a decision already made, that of driving, and the HEC Montréal study prices what that decision costs before the powertrain is chosen at all. It is the “shift” lever of FAQ 10, with a price on it.

The caveats: commuting in the Montréal agglomeration only, about 12 % of Quebec's emissions

The scope comes from the 2018 Origin-Destination survey and covers only home-to-work and home-to-school travel. The shift holds only where the alternative exists: outside the metropolitan region the car exceeds 85 % of trips, so the lever is weakest where dependence is strongest, which makes this a question of land-use planning. The study values a tonne of CO₂ at $473 where this tool's slider starts at $275, both from Environment and Climate Change Canada; cutting the other way, it leaves out noise, soil and water for want of public data. Finally the denominator changes everything: per person per year, walking is the cheapest of the four modes, because walking trips are short; per kilometre it is the most expensive, $3.61 against $2.48, because it is slow and the user's time enters the calculation.

Run the numbers on your own trip. The authors publish an online calculator built on the same data: borough, mode, one-way distance and travel time, with and without congestion. Left blank, distance and time take the survey averages. It returns the annual cost of the trip, over 250 trips a year, broken down into private, public and external costs. The project page also carries the report, the calculation spreadsheet and the maps.

Mobilité Montréal: the social costs of transport, HEC Montréal · Mobility cost calculator · Évolution des coûts du système de transport par automobile au Québec, Trajectoire Québec and David Suzuki Foundation (in French) · L’auto coûte 51 G$ par année au Québec, Le Journal de Québec (in French) · Le transport collectif : un projet économique de société, Montreal Metropolitan Community (in French) · Réduire l'usage de la voiture, Le Climatoscope (in French) · Capturing the economic and environmental potentials of a behavioral disruption in transportation, Sustainability Science and Technology


Sources

Show the 102 references
  1. Accès transports viables. (2021). Mobilité durable, électrification, aménagement : le futur de nos villes [Video, in French]. Point tournant, episode 6. YouTube. Quebec documentary web series on sustainable mobility and land-use planning.
  2. ADAC. (2025). ADAC-Dauertest: ID.3 erreicht Garantiegrenze des Akkus. A VW ID.3 driven 160 000 km in four years, with more than 40 % of charging on DC fast chargers and long stays parked at full charge, retains 91 % of its capacity.
  3. Adebayo, T. S. et al. (2025). Can household energy efficiency dampen crude oil price volatility in the United States? PLOS One. Cutting household oil consumption dampens crude price volatility.
  4. Affaires automobiles. (2024). La CCAQ en 2024 (The CCAQ in 2024). Profile of Québec’s dealer network: about 890 outlets, 99% of the network and 45 000 direct jobs.
  5. Affaires automobiles. (2025). La CCAQ salue l’annonce du report de l’échéance de la norme VZE (The CCAQ welcomes the postponement of the ZEV standard deadline; in French). October 1, 2025. The Corporation des concessionnaires automobiles du Québec asks that the 2026 target “be halved, with a steady progression to 2030”.
  6. ADEME, French Agency for Ecological Transition. (2026). Empreinte carbone des batteries de véhicules électriques : évaluation, analyse d'impacts et enjeux méthodologiques liés au règlement européen (EU) 2023/1542 (Carbon footprint of electric vehicle batteries). Mir, C., & El Jebbari, H., June 2026. A 50 kWh NMC 811 battery made in China: 7.0 t CO₂e excluding end of life, or 140 kg/kWh, of which 28 % for the anode graphite and about 15 % for modules, housing, electronics and transport (section 4.1). About 125 kg/kWh for LFP, read from figure 6, data the report itself rates as weak.
  7. ChargeLab. (2026). ChargeLab Rewards terms & conditions. Program terms, updated October 8, 2026, in English and French on the same page: $0.10 per kWh of residential charging, paid every quarter in digital gift cards; under $5, nothing is paid for the quarter and the amount is not carried over. The charger must be used at a single-family residence.
  8. Chargy. (2026). Get Paid to Charge. The Chargy Network’s program: 10¢ per kWh, paid every month by Interac e-Transfer, only in months of at least 100 kWh. Any OCPP charger except Tesla, ChargePoint, FLO and Pion. Page in English only; the company sells chargers.
  9. DashSharing. (2026). Terms of Service. Program terms, in force October 1, 2026: 3¢ per kWh up to 1 500 kWh, then 11¢, earnings paid in $100 increments. The charger is the company’s, against a refundable deposit, and the company may accept or reject an application.
  10. FLO. ([n.d.]). Carbon Credit Management Service. Credit management service, with FuSE, for owners of commercial chargers. For home chargers, the page notes that only network operators can claim the credits. No program for individuals as of October 16, 2026.
  11. Grizzl-E (United Chargers). (2026). Grizzl-E Club. Program of the maker of Grizzl-E chargers, terms in force September 22, 2026: 3¢ per kWh on enrolment, then 1¢ more every 5 000 cumulative kWh, up to 10¢ from 35 000 kWh, a purchased charger starting at 5¢. $100 deposit refunded after the first charge, monthly withdrawal from $10, taxable rewards. The company may approve or deny an application. The page reads in a browser, its content being written by a script.
  12. International Energy Agency. (2021). The role of critical minerals in clean energy transitions. IEA.
  13. International Energy Agency. (2024). EV Life Cycle Assessment Calculator. Online life-cycle calculator for passenger cars, launched in June 2024: battery electric, plug-in hybrid and combustion, country by country, vehicle and battery manufacturing, fuel production and combustion included, infrastructure excluded. Vehicle size, annual mileage, lifetime, grid intensity and biofuel share can be adjusted; the methodology statement draws in part on the GREET model.
  14. International Energy Agency. (2025). World energy investment 2025. IEA.
  15. International Energy Agency. (2026). Global EV Outlook 2026. Second-hand market and resale value of electric cars, chapter 2.
  16. International Energy Agency. (2026). Global methane tracker 2026. IEA.
  17. American Automobile Association. (2026). AAA study reveals temperature impacts on EV and hybrid performance, efficiency and costs. Three electric and three hybrid vehicles on a dynamometer at −7 °C, 24 °C and 35 °C.
  18. American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers. (2024). AFPM hits airwaves with new ads calling for Congress to overturn Biden EPA gas car ban [press release]. May 13, 2024. The “U-Turn” campaign, “eight-figure,” in nine states, to overturn the EPA’s vehicle emission standards.
  19. Arslanoğlu, H., & Yaraş, A. (2021). Recovery of molybdenum, cobalt and nickel from spent hydrodesulphurization catalyst through oxidizing roast followed by sodium persulfate leaching. Sustainable Materials and Technologies, 28, e00286.
  20. Arval. (2026). Ce que révèle l'analyse de 24 000 batteries (What the analysis of 24 000 batteries reveals). 1 June 2026. State-of-health certificates issued by Moba and Aviloo in 11 countries, from March 2023 to September 2025: 89 % capacity at 200 000 km for electrics, about 1.7 % loss a year.
  21. Axsen, J., & Kurani, K. S. (2012). Interpersonal influence within car buyers' social networks: applying five perspectives to plug-in hybrid vehicle drivers. Environment and Planning A, 44(5), 1047-1065.
  22. Canadian Automobile Association. (2025). CAA winter drive. Fourteen models driven to full discharge between Ottawa and Mont-Tremblant, at −7 to −15 °C.
  23. Association pour la santé publique du Québec. (2025). Consultation sur la cible de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre du Québec (Consultation on Québec’s greenhouse gas reduction target) [Brief to the Commission des transports et de l'environnement, in French]. December 2025. Léger survey of September 2025: more than 74% of Quebecers concerned about air quality because of urban smog and forest fire smoke, close to 70% having felt the effects of extreme heat on their health in the past five years. Road transport is associated with $3.1 billion a year in median mortality and morbidity in Québec through its contribution to air pollution.
  24. AutoMédia. (2026). Analyse des ventes de véhicules 100 % électriques au Québec en 2025 (Analysis of 2025 battery-electric vehicle sales in Québec; in French). March 9, 2026. 42 064 vehicles sold in 2025 against 102 819 in 2024, 59.1% fewer; quarterly compilation from automakers, dealers and public agencies.
  25. Bank of Canada. ([n.d.]). Daily exchange rates. Average rate of the U.S. dollar in Canadian dollars, series FXUSDCAD: 1.4271 on October 9, 2026, the rate that converts the five engine maintenance items taken from Argonne.
  26. Barla, P., Dubé, J., Gagné, B., & Miranda-Moreno, L. (2023). Spatio-temporal Analysis of Electric Vehicle Adoption in Quebec. Université Laval. Adoption compared across 410 Québec zones, 2012 to 2018.
  27. Beaudin, G., Julien, M., & Benatia, D. (2024). Mobilité Montréal : les coûts sociaux des transports. Study report, HEC Montréal, June 2024.

    What the study quantifies. Private, public and external costs of the four travel modes of the Montréal agglomeration, for the home-to-work and home-to-school trips of the 2018 Origin-Destination survey: $15 250 per person per year by car, everything included, $7 450 by public transit, $2 400 by bicycle and $2 050 on foot, and $13 703M a year for all the agglomeration's commuters, of which $9 393M for the car alone, split into $3 682M of private cost, $1 756M of public cost and $3 955M of external cost (Figure 3). The social cost reaches $1.55 per dollar spent by a motorist against $0.49 for public transit, and $1.51 per person-kilometre against $0.51, with cycling and walking returning $0.13 and $0.05 (Table A-5.1).

    Modal shift. Shifting trips of 10 km or less would be worth $1.7 billion a year for the agglomeration, 21 % of the greenhouse gases from work- and study-related road travel, up to 55 % of congestion and 46 % of collisions, and 1 to 2 Mt CO₂e for Quebec as a whole; $3 530 in private spending and $10 130 in social costs per driver who shifts.

    Two pointers. The study values a tonne of CO₂ at $473, from the same Environment and Climate Change Canada guidance as this tool's slider. The project page carries the report, the calculation spreadsheet, the maps and the webinar.
  28. Pion Power. (2026). GreenMiles EV Charging Rewards. The manufacturer’s program: 10¢ per kWh, 6¢ more beyond 5 000 kWh during a Thanksgiving promotion. Paid once a year, in $100 increments, the remainder carried over. Pion Flex-AC chargers only.
  29. Solution Novyra. (2026). Adhésion Ecowatt [in French]. Manager of TechnoVE’s EcoWatt program: $0.12 per kWh, an “indicative and variable” rate revised once a year, in July. Compensation paid once a year by cheque, the first in summer 2027, provided the credits sell.
  30. SWTCH. (2026). Terms of Service. SWTCH Home Charging Program, terms updated August 19, 2026: free charger against a $300 deposit, paid 3¢ per kWh on the first 1 500 kWh then 11¢, or purchased charger, paid 11¢. Payout by direct deposit once the balance reaches $100.
  31. TechnoVE. ([n.d.]). Programme EcoWatt [in French]. Eligible chargers: TechnoVE models made since 2020, connected over Wi-Fi and without a screen.
  32. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2011). Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. United Nations. The commentary to Principle 14 gives the three criteria by which the severity of an impact is judged: "Severity of impacts will be judged by their scale, scope and irremediable character." It anchors the scale of the seven set scores in this tool. What it must not be made to say: Principle 24, which makes severity relative, is a rule for prioritizing within a single enterprise, not a licence to compare two supply chains.
  33. Ministère de l'Environnement, de la Lutte contre les changements climatiques, de la Faune et des Parcs. (2026). Directive pour la réalisation d'une étude d'impact sur l'environnement [Directive for environmental impact studies, in French]. 2026 edition, 40 pages. It states what makes an impact important: the wider, more frequent, more lasting or more intense it is, the greater its importance. Four properties, of which this tool's scale keeps intensity, extent and duration; frequency is carried by level 4, where the impact repeats with use.
  34. Beaudin, G., Julien, M., & Benatia, D. (2024). Projet Mobilité [workbook]. HEC Montréal. The study's calculation workbook. Its "Résultats finaux - PAR PERSONNE" sheet gives the annual cost per person of sixteen items, for each of the four modes and each of the three categories, where Figure 3 of the report publishes only the three totals: it is the source of the nine items in this tool's graph. The car's greenhouse gas and pollutant cost stands there at $678.8 per person a year, while the congestion sheet carries $224.3 of extra emissions alongside its $1 501.5 of time lost and $328.0 of use: together they make the 14 % of external cost that Figure 3 allowed to be computed from its 1.15 Mt CO2e. The user counts that follow, 616 096 motorists, 519 046 transit riders, 46 488 cyclists and 163 128 pedestrians, recover the modal shares of Table A-5.1.
  35. Beaudin, G., Julien, M., & Benatia, D. (2024). Calculateur des coûts de mobilité [application]. HEC Montréal. Annual cost of a trip by borough or city on the island of Montréal, mode, one-way distance and travel time with and without congestion, broken down into private, public and external costs, on the basis of 250 trips a year; fields left blank take the Origin-Destination survey averages for that borough and that mode.
  36. Berkeley, N., Bailey, D., Jones, A., & Jarvis, D. (2017). Assessing the transition towards Battery Electric Vehicles: A Multi-Level Perspective on drivers of, and barriers to, take up. Transportation Research Part A, 106, 320-332. The multi-level perspective applied to the drivers of, and barriers to, the electric vehicle.
  37. Beylot, A. et al. (2025). Gaps and lack of harmonization in LCA of the electromobility sector: where do we stand and where could we go?. The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment, 30, 2964-2983. A stocktaking of the method divergences that remain in life-cycle assessments of electromobility, and what it would take to narrow them. An output of the TranSensus LCA project.
  38. Bieker, G. (2021). A global comparison of the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of combustion engine and electric passenger cars. International Council on Clean Transportation. Its table A.1 quantifies the production and recycling of the glider and powertrain, battery excluded, of a European lower medium car: 7.2 t CO₂e for petrol as for diesel, 7.9 for a plug-in hybrid and 6.5 for a battery electric vehicle, which is 10 % less. Divided by the mass of the segment, those amounts give 5.2 t CO₂e per tonne of vehicle for a combustion vehicle and 4.7 for an electric one, the two factors used here. The values are derived from the study Ricardo, ifeu and E4tech carried out for the European Commission.
  39. Bieker, G., & Negri, M. (2025). Life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions from passenger cars in the European Union: A 2025 update and key factors to consider. International Council on Clean Transportation. European update of the 2021 report: 63 g CO₂e/km for battery electric vehicles against 235 for gasoline, a break-even around 17 000 km, and an estimate 24 % below the 2021 figure. A 53.4 kWh battery, the 2023 sales average of the medium segment, at 72.8 kg CO₂e/kWh, or 3.9 t; according to the GREET model, 69 for LFP and 79 for NMC 811 made in China (section 2, table 2).
  40. BloombergNEF. (2025). Lithium-Ion Battery Pack Prices Fall to $108 per Kilowatt-Hour Despite Rising Metal Prices. Annual battery pack price survey.
  41. Bouillass, G., Blanc, I., & Perez-Lopez, P. (2021). Step-by-step social life cycle assessment framework: a participatory approach for the identification and prioritization of impact subcategories applied to mobility scenarios. The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment, 26(12), 2408–2435. Applies the S-LCA framework to the comparison between electric and conventional vehicles in France, using the PSILCA database. Open access.
  42. Brandt, A. R., Englander, J., & Bharadwaj, S. (2013). The energy efficiency of oil sands extraction: Energy return ratios from 1970 to 2010. Energy, 55, 693–702. Energy return of oil sands extraction from 1970 to 2010: from about 1 GJ produced per GJ consumed in 1970 to 3.5-4 in situ and 5.5-6 for mining in 2010.
  43. Brandt, A. R., Sun, Y., Bharadwaj, S., Livingston, D., Tan, E., & Gordon, D. (2015). Energy return on investment (EROI) for forty global oilfields using a detailed engineering-based model of oil production. PLOS One, 10(12), e0144141. Energy return of forty conventional oilfields: production-weighted average of 33 to 1, ranging from 2 to over 100 by field. Scope limited to extraction, refining excluded.
  44. Bretter, C., Hornsey, M. J., et al. (2025). Mapping, understanding and reducing belief in misinformation about electric vehicles. Nature Energy, June 2025. Four countries, 6 341 respondents: more people believe false claims about electric vehicles than reject them; conspiracy mentality is the strongest predictor, and a fact sheet or an AI dialogue lowers those beliefs at ten days.
  45. Brulle, R. J. (2018). The climate lobby: A sectorial analysis of lobbying spending on climate change in the U.S. Congress. Climatic Change, 149(3), 289–303.
  46. Burnham, A., Gohlke, D., Rush, L., Stephens, T., Zhou, Y., Delucchi, M. A., Birky, A., Hunter, C., Lin, Z., Ou, S., Xie, F., Proctor, C., Wiryadinata, S., Liu, N., & Boloor, M. (2021). Comprehensive Total Cost of Ownership Quantification for Vehicles with Different Size Classes and Powertrains. Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/ESD-21/4. Table 3.16 gives the interval and cost of 24 maintenance items per powertrain, in 2019 U.S. dollars: 10.1 cents a mile for a gasoline car, 6.0 for an electric one. The tool takes the four that only the engine requires: spark plugs, US$225 every 60 000 miles; air filter, US$40 every 30 000; transmission fluid, US$200 every 90 000; accessory drive belt, US$165 every 90 000.
  47. International Labour Organization. Occupational safety and health in the oil and gas production and oil refining sector.
  48. CAA-Québec. ([no date]). Est-ce plus cher d'assurer un véhicule électrique ? [Podcast, in French]. Season 2, on insurance. An electric vehicle's premium follows the cost of repairs and of the battery, not the drivetrain itself.
  49. CAA-Québec. (2025). Le Québec, leader en matière d’électromobilité [press release] (Québec, a leader in electric mobility; in French). January 14, 2025. Survey of 16 041 electric vehicle drivers in Canada: 85% will probably or very probably choose another electric, 91% cite the cost of charging, 67% have already had range trouble in very cold weather.
  50. DiscoverAirdrie, Golden West. (2026). Ottawa proposes scrapping EV mandate as Alberta declares victory. August 18, 2026. Joint statement by Danielle Smith and Grant Hunter: “Today marks a clear victory for Albertans,” consumers free to choose their vehicle.
  51. Campbell, J. E., & Geyer, R. (2026). The climate benefits of retiring a fully operational internal combustion engine vehicle. Science, 393(6811). Retiring a still-running gasoline vehicle to replace it with an electric one reduces emissions in 92 % of the configurations examined, including when the vehicle is new. The basis for FAQ 2.
  52. Canadian Auto Dealer. (2026). Auto industry applauds Carney’s auto strategy. February 6, 2026. CADA president Tim Reuss: “Dealers across Canada particularly applaud the government for ending the EV mandate”; the association calls at the same time for the return of incentives and for chargers.
  53. Canadian Climate Institute. (2026). Repealing Canada’s electric vehicle standard and delaying its replacement puts 2035 sales goal at risk [statement]. August 14, 2026. Rick Smith: the new standards must be “strong enough to deliver the EV deployment the Prime Minister has promised,” otherwise Canadians are left with “fewer electric vehicle options and higher total operating costs.”
  54. Carscoops. (2025). Everyone’s Buying Pickup Trucks, But Almost No One’s Using Them That Way. 8 November 2025. Report on a Strategic Vision survey of US new-vehicle buyers, sample size not published: nearly 90% of pickup buyers never use their truck for work, and nearly 40% drive it purely for pleasure at least once a week. For the firm’s president, Alexander Edwards, the purchase is about identity: the vehicle should help buyers become their ideal self.
  55. Carscoops. (2026). Tesla's per-car profit tumbled to $2,140, and tariffs are part of why. Reporting the Nikkei Asia analysis: net profit per vehicle by automaker for fiscal 2025, the four quarters ending between January and March 2026. Tesla first at US$2 140, Toyota second at US$2 104, a gap of under $40 against more than $600 a year earlier.
  56. Canada Energy Regulator. ([no date]). Provincial and Territorial Energy Profiles – Quebec. Quebec's energy balance: electricity generation, consumption and trade.
  57. Carrère, T., Khalid, U., Baumann, M., Bouzidi, M., & Allard, B. (2024). Carbon footprint assessment of manufacturing of synthetic graphite battery anode material for electric mobility applications. Journal of Energy Storage, 94, 112356. Three authors from Tokai COBEX, a European maker of anode graphite, and two from Sphera. Chinese synthetic graphite at 42.2 kg CO₂e/kg according to ADEME, which sees in it most of its gap with the literature.
  58. ChargeHub. ([n.d.]). Charging station map. Mogile Technologies. Multi-network map of Canada and the United States, continuously updated.
  59. ChargeLab. ([n.d.]). Get paid to charge your EV in Canada. The charging-software company's rewards program: 10¢ per kWh charged at home, at the same rate anywhere in Canada, for a compatible smart charger, among about ten brands, connected to its app. Paid in gift cards, then in cash from the end of 2026 according to its FAQ.
  60. Circuit électrique. ([n.d.]). Borne de recharge rapide de 320 kW. Up to 320 kW, an advertised charge in 25 to 30 minutes, varying with the vehicle and the state of the battery.
  61. Clean Energy Canada. (2026). Back in the Race. Report in the My Clean Bill series, April 2026, funded by the RBC Foundation; Clean Energy Canada is a program of Simon Fraser University. Total cost of ownership of new vehicles over ten years, at 20 000 km a year, with 2025 energy prices and the rebates in force on March 16, 2026. Depreciation is the same for every powertrain and is computed on the list price. In Montreal, the electric sedan comes to $514 a month against $749, the SUV to $541 against $814. The RAV4 plug-in hybrid saves $9 610 to $12 011 over the gasoline version, against $26 209 for the electric bZ.
  62. Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c CCQ-1991. Article 1097. Improvements to the common portions are carried by three quarters of the votes of co-owners present or represented. The Code contains no provision on charging stations: the word “recharge” does not appear in it.
  63. CAA-Québec. (2026). Ajustement des phares, recharger sur 120 volts: les conseils de la semaine (Headlight adjustment, charging on 120 volts: this week’s tips; in French). Le Nouvelliste, March 30, 2026. Advice column: the 120 V outlet should be protected by a breaker of at least 15 amps and ideally be alone on its circuit, with no extension cord or adapter the manufacturer does not approve.
  64. Communauté métropolitaine de Montréal, & Chambre de commerce du Montréal métropolitain. (2026). Le transport collectif : un projet économique de société (Public transit: an economic project for society). August 2026. Simulations by the Institut de la statistique du Québec, in 2025 dollars: for $100 million spent, $27 million of value added for cars against $85 million for public transit, 231 jobs against 579, and $57 million of imports against $15 million. Quebec households spend $9 547 a year on their vehicles, more than on groceries.
  65. Conseil régional de l’environnement de Montréal. (2024). Fiche thématique : bornes de recharge publiques.
  66. Mastrandrea, M. D., Field, C. B., Stocker, T. F. et al. (2010). Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Finalised in November 2010 and accepted at the 33rd Session of the IPCC in May 2011, it crosses how robust the evidence is, limited, medium or robust, with how far the sources agree, low, medium or high, in nine cells that yield five levels of confidence, from very low to very high. It is the framework the force field uses to say what is known about each force, separately from its weight.
  67. Ministry for the Ecological Transition (France). (2026). L'encadrement des publicités des véhicules motorisés (Rules on motor vehicle advertising). Since 1 March 2022, every motor vehicle advertisement must carry a message in favour of active or shared mobility and the emissions class label. The climate and resilience act further bans, from 1 January 2028, advertising for passenger cars emitting more than 123 g of CO₂ per kilometre.
  68. Ministry for the Ecological Transition (France). (2026). Le leasing social 2026 (Social leasing 2026, in French). Lease of a new electric car for under €200 a month for lower-income households that need their car to work, opened on 16 July 2026, for at least 50 000 households.
  69. Chair in Energy Sector Management. (n.d.). Le parc automobile du Québec (Quebec's vehicle fleet). HEC Montréal. Average consumption across the light-vehicle fleet stands at 9.2 L/100 km.
  70. Chair in Energy Sector Management. (2026). État de l'énergie au Québec 2026 (The state of energy in Quebec). HEC Montréal.
  71. Chair in Energy Sector Management. (2026). La Chaire de gestion du secteur de l’énergie de HEC Montréal publie la 12e édition de l’État de l’énergie au Québec (press release for the 12th edition of the State of Energy in Québec; in French). HEC Montréal, February 12, 2026. SUVs and trucks at 86% of sales in 2024 against 24% in 1990, $25.9 billion spent on new vehicles, first decline of the gasoline and diesel fleet.
  72. Chair in Taxation and Public Finance. (2025). Examen des réductions accordées à l'égard de la taxe sur les carburants (Review of fuel tax reductions). CFFP report R2025-05, Université de Sherbrooke.
  73. Chair in Taxation and Public Finance. (2024). Remplacer (éventuellement) la taxe sur les carburants par une taxe kilométrique ? (Replacing the fuel tax with a distance-based charge?). Working paper 2024/06, Université de Sherbrooke.
  74. Daggett, C. (2018). Petro-masculinity: Fossil Fuels and Authoritarian Desire. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 47(1), 25-44.
  75. Degen, F., Schütte, M., & Krüger, S. (2025). Comparative life cycle assessment of lithium-ion, sodium-ion, and solid-state battery cells. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 29(1), 123–138.
  76. Direction régionale de santé publique de Montréal. ([n.d.]). Pollution atmosphérique (Air pollution; in French). Transport accounts for 45% of the agglomeration’s fine particles, wood heating for 39%.
  77. écoconso. (2026). Quelle voiture utiliser pour moins polluer ? (Which car to use to pollute less). Updated 15 January 2026. Five models compared over five years at 15 000 km a year with the carcostcalculator.brussels tool, electricity at €0.33 per kWh: the used electric comes out cheaper than the new gasoline version on four of the five.
  78. EIT Urban Mobility. (2025). Study on non-exhaust emissions in road transport. Study carried out by Emisia with Transport for London and the Greater London Authority, May 2025. An electric car weighs about 20 % more than the equivalent gasoline car and wears its tyres about 20 % more, wear being proportional to mass (key finding 3.13, p. 32). Used in the wallet calculator: an electric car's tyres are changed there every 67 056 km instead of 80 467.
  79. Electric Autonomy Canada. (2025). iZEV rebates to pause in March, government confirms. Announced on January 10, 2025 with no end date, the pause of the federal program triggered a rush of applications that emptied the envelope: the program closed on January 12, two days later.
  80. Electricity Maps. ([no date]). Québec (CA-QC). Carbon intensity of the Quebec grid in real time, imports and exports included.
  81. Eltohamy, H. et al. (2024). Review of current practices of life cycle assessment in electric mobility: A first step towards method harmonization. Sustainable Production and Consumption, 52, 299-313. A review of existing life-cycle assessment practice in electric mobility, the first milestone of the European harmonization effort.
  82. Ember. (2025). Global Electricity Review 2025. Average carbon intensity of electricity worldwide: 473 g CO₂/kWh.
  83. Ember. (2026). Electric energy security: how EVs are reducing oil import vulnerabilities. Euan Graham, October 13, 2026. From March to August 2026, electric vehicles in oil-importing countries displaced about 200 million barrels of crude, some US$20 billion, each month of displaced barrels being valued at the average Brent price; China accounts for three quarters of it. Denmark thereby avoids 13 % of its oil consumption. Canada is not covered.
  84. Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit. (2025). New analysis finds widespread misinformation around EVs in UK newspapers. August 26, 2025. Six months of British national press: 25% of EV articles carry at least one misleading claim, 38% a negative framing against 26% positive.
  85. Energy Solutions. (2026). What happens to old EV batteries? 95 % lithium recovery (2026). January 2026. Plain-language account of the thresholds of the European battery regulation, recycled content and recovery rates.
  86. Environment and Climate Change Canada. ([no date]). Clean Fuel Regulations. Requires gasoline and diesel suppliers to reduce the carbon intensity of their products, and creates the credit market that charging stations can feed.
  87. Environment and Climate Change Canada. (2022). Social cost of greenhouse gas emissions. Updated interim guidance for the Government of Canada, in force since 12 December 2022. Annual values from 2020 to 2080 in constant 2021 Canadian dollars, at a 2 % discount rate: $275 a tonne of CO₂ in 2026, $294 in 2030.
  88. Environmental Defence. (2025). Big Oil’s lobbying playbook: A summary of Big Oil’s 2024 federal lobbying. March 4, 2025. 1 135 meetings between the fossil fuel industry and the federal government in 2024, 356 of them for the Pathways Alliance and its members.
  89. Équiterre. ([n.d.]). Catalogue des véhicules rechargeables offerts au Canada (Catalogue of plug-in vehicles sold in Canada).
  90. Équiterre. ([n.d.]). Les avantages du vélo à assistance électrique (The benefits of electric-assist bicycles).
  91. Équiterre. (2022). Sans limite : la publicité automobile au Canada [PDF] (No limits: automotive advertising in Canada; in French). Analysis of 132 ads from Canadian newspapers and magazines, January 2019 to May 2020: 79% feature light trucks, 68% tie them to nature; industry advertising budget of at least $446 million in 2018.
  92. Euronews. (2026). Amsterdam to enact landmark ban on fossil fuel and meat advertising in public spaces. Adopted by the city council on 22 January 2026 and in force since 1 May, the ban covers all of the city's public spaces, buses, trams and metro stations included.
  93. European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2023). Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 concerning batteries and waste batteries. Digital passport from 18 February 2027; minimum recycled content from 18 August 2031, 16 % of the cobalt, 6 % of the lithium, 6 % of the nickel and 85 % of the lead, rising to 26, 12 and 15 % in 2036; lithium recovery of 50 % by the end of 2027 and 80 % by the end of 2031.
  94. Everingham, J.-A. et al. (2024). Beyond closure: a literature review and research agenda for post-mining transitions. Resources Policy. About 75 % of mine closures happen unexpectedly, outside any planning process.
  95. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. ([n.d.]). Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. State of Alaska and federal trustees in charge of restoration after the 1989 spill; publishes the recovery status of the injured resources.
  96. Forbes. (2024). This Scottish city just banned SUV and airline ads. On 28 May 2024, Edinburgh city council banned advertising by oil companies, airlines, cruise lines, fossil-fuel vehicles and SUVs on the advertising space it owns.
  97. Fried, A., Shaffer, B., & Hastings-Simon, S. (2024). Sufficiency of level 1 charging to meet electric vehicle charging requirements. Environmental Research: Infrastructure and Sustainability, 4(2), 021001. Real trips of 129 fully electric vehicles in Calgary, December 2021 to December 2022, from ENMAX’s pilot project. Charged at 120 V whenever parked for six hours including 5 a.m., 29 % would have needed no fast charging at all, and only 18 % twelve or more sessions in the year. The authors flag a small sample of early adopters.
  98. Gazette officielle du Québec. (2026). Projet de règlement abrogeant le Règlement prévoyant certaines prohibitions à l'égard de véhicules automobiles et de moteurs à combustion [PDF, in French]. Part 2, 23 June 2026, year 158, no. 25, p. 3424. Repeals the regulation enacted by order in council 1772-2024 of 11 December 2024, which banned the sale and lease of new combustion vehicles from model years 2034 and 2035. The ministry puts the net cost to society at nearly $2.71 million a year.
  99. Geels, F. W. (2014). Regime resistance against low-carbon transitions: Introducing politics and power into the multi-level perspective. Theory, Culture & Society, 31(5), 21-40. Four forms of power through which incumbents resist: instrumental, discursive, material and institutional.
  100. Geels, F. W., Sovacool, B. K., Schwanen, T., & Sorrell, S. (2017). Sociotechnical transitions for deep decarbonization. Science, 357(6357), 1242-1244.
  101. Gellai, I., Kardos, M., Popovac, M., & Šimić, D. (2025). Simulation and experimental validation of a 1D cabin thermal model for electric trucks with enhanced insulation and heating panels. World Electric Vehicle Journal, 16(11), Article 609.
  102. Geslin, A. et al. (2024). Dynamic cycling enhances battery lifetime. Nature Energy. The constant-current cycling of laboratory protocols understates real lifetime by as much as 38 % compared with realistic driving profiles.
  103. Geotab. (2026). Electric vehicle battery health analysis.
  104. Global Energy Monitor. (2025). Global oil and gas infrastructure tracker.
  105. Global EV Alliance. (2024). Results world wide EV-drivers survey 2024: 92 % of EV drivers will never go back!. December 10, 2024. More than 23 000 drivers in 18 countries: 92% would buy an electric vehicle again, 1% would return to gasoline or diesel, 4% would take a plug-in hybrid; running cost, then climate, top the reasons.
  106. Gouvernement du Québec. (2020). Plan pour une économie verte 2030 (2030 Plan for a Green Economy, in French). Ministry of the Environment and the Fight against Climate Change. A target of 37.5% below the 1990 level by 2030, carbon neutrality in 2050, transport as the leading emitting sector, and 1.5 million light electric vehicles sought for 2030.
  107. Gouvernement du Québec. (2022). Québec favorise l'économie circulaire en assujettissant de nouveaux produits à la responsabilité élargie des producteurs (REP) (Quebec adds new products to extended producer responsibility) [Press release]. 21 June 2022. Electric vehicle batteries are removed from the products covered, “in light of the many comments received” from the industry, in favour of a voluntary recovery programme.
  108. Gouvernement du Québec. (2023). Stratégie québécoise sur la recharge de véhicules électriques 2023-2030 (Québec strategy on electric vehicle charging).
  109. Gouvernement du Québec. (2026). Cible de réduction des GES : Québec maintient une cible ambitieuse, mais réaliste (Québec keeps an ambitious but realistic GHG target) [Press release, in French]. January 22, 2026. The deadline for the 37.5% target below the 1990 level moves from 2030 to 2035, the percentage unchanged; carbon neutrality is still sought for 2050.
  110. Gouvernement du Québec. (2026). Écorecharge: financial assistance for a charging station. Replaces Roulez vert. A resident stream and a building stream, the latter covering half of eligible costs up to $120 000 per building.
  111. Gouvernement du Québec. (2026). How to charge an electric vehicle. Updated August 10, 2026. For a fully electric vehicle, charging on a 120 V outlet “may not be sufficient”: seven hours give back about 40 kilometres.
  112. Gouvernement du Québec. (2026). Plan de mise en œuvre 2026-2031 du Plan pour une économie verte 2030 (2026-2031 implementation plan, in French). More than $8.2 billion over five years. Transport accounts for close to 45% of Québec’s emissions in 2023, three quarters of that from road transport alone, or 34% of the total. The trajectory of the measures planned and funded is put at 32.1% below the 1990 level in 2035, short of the 37.5% target.
  113. Gouvernement du Québec. ([n.d.]). Financial assistance for an electric vehicle. The Roulez vert program: amounts in force, eligibility conditions, and the end of the program on December 31, 2026.
  114. Gouvernement du Québec. (2026). Eligible expenses for a home charging station. Residential component of Écorecharge: $600 on the acquisition cost of the charger alone, which must be at least $600 before tax; installation, delivery and taxes are not eligible. A charger obtained free of charge from a business offering home-charging incentives does not qualify.
  115. Government of Canada. ([n.d.]). Excise Tax Act. Schedule I, section 7: $100 excise tax on any air conditioner designed for a motor vehicle, counted in the price estimates of the gasoline model selector.
  116. Government of Canada. (2022). Regulations Amending the Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations (Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles). SOR/2022-254, Canada Gazette, Part II, 21 December 2022. A minimum sound at low speed, under UN Regulation No. 138 or the American standard FMVSS 141.
  117. Government of Canada. (2022). Clean Fuel Regulations. SOR/2022-140, section 102. A residential charger creates credits only for a compliance period beginning on or before January 1, 2035, and only if it is installed on or before December 31, 2030. A public charger has no end date.
  118. Gruber, V., Peignier, I., Dubuc, C., Pentcheva, E., & Cayard, Y.-E. (2021). Achat de camions légers au Canada : analyse des motivations (Light truck purchases in Canada: an analysis of motivations). CIRANO, for Équiterre. Survey of 1 377 Canadian owners.
  119. Hausberger, S., Landl, L., & Ketan, E. (2025). Messung und Simulation von Non-Exhaust Partikelemissionen (Measurement and simulation of non-exhaust particle emissions). Graz University of Technology, report for the Federal Office for the Environment (Switzerland), 21 January 2025. Simulation over a mixed route: brakes, 2.3 mg of PM10 per km for a 1 860 kg electric against 16.1 for a 1 436 kg gasoline car (table 6-1); tyres, 6.8 against 6.0 (table 6-2).
  120. Health Canada. (2024). Outdoor air pollution and health: Overview. Page modified 2 October 2024. About 17 400 premature deaths a year in Canada attributable to air pollution, 2018 data, for $146 billion in 2020 dollars; road traffic accounts for $9.5 billion in 2015 dollars.
  121. Health Canada. (2025). Traffic-related air pollution: A systematic review-based human health risk assessment of mortality. 18 March 2025. About 1 200 premature deaths a year in Canada, for $9.5 billion in 2015 dollars; causal link established with all-cause mortality.
  122. Highway Loss Data Institute. (2016). Insurance losses: comparison of electric vehicles and their conventional counterparts while adjusting for mileage, bulletin 33-04. The founding figure of the insurance myth: collision severity 63.5% higher for the Model S.
  123. Highway Loss Data Institute. (2020). Insurance losses of electric vehicles and their conventional counterparts while adjusting for mileage (Bulletin vol. 37, n° 25).
  124. Huber, M., Welker, A., & Helmreich, B. (2016). Critical review of heavy metal pollution of traffic area runoff: Occurrence, influencing factors, and partitioning. Science of The Total Environment, 541, 895–919. Review of heavy metals in road runoff, tyre, brake and road-surface wear included.
  125. Husmann, J., Northey, S., Beylot, A., Blömeke, S., & Herrmann, C. (2025). Inconsistencies in handling of multifunctionality in the environmental footprint of electric vehicle batteries: a cross-industry analysis. The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment, 30, 1560-1578. How industries handle multifunctionality differently in battery footprints, recycling in particular: the same battery can carry widely separated results depending on the convention chosen.
  126. Hydro-Québec. (2021). 4 500 nouvelles bornes pour faciliter la recharge des véhicules électriques dans les centres urbains. Press release. A programme for municipalities: up to $12 000 per charger for curbside and municipal-lot charging, 4 500 chargers by 2028, aimed at overnight charging in neighbourhoods where residents cannot charge at home.
  127. Hydro-Québec. (2022). La recharge de véhicules électriques dans un multilogement (Charging electric vehicles in a multi-unit building; in French). First edition, December 2019, updated June 2022. A 120 V outlet dedicated to charging must be fed by a separate circuit (section 86-306 of the code). Access requires a formal request to the syndicate or the owner. Billing actual consumption requires approved meters, which a flat fee avoids.
  128. Hydro-Québec. (2023). Plan d'action 2035 : Plus de réseau, plus d'énergie, une meilleure qualité de service (2035 Action Plan).
  129. Hydro-Québec. (2025). Life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions.
  130. Hydro-Québec. (2025). Les gaz à effet de serre et les réservoirs (Greenhouse gases and reservoirs). Emissions peak two to four years after impoundment, then return within less than ten years to the level of surrounding lakes.
  131. Hydro-Québec. (2025). Taux d'émission de GES associés à l'électricité (GHG emission rates associated with electricity). A Hydro-Québec explainer, which attributes the creation of reservoirs to land-use change. The 34.5 g rate itself comes from Levasseur et al., whose whole purpose is to quantify reservoir emissions and fold them in.
  132. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022). Demand, services and social aspects of mitigation. Chapter 5 of the Working Group III contribution to the sixth assessment report. Source of the Avoid–Shift–Improve framework used in question 10.
  133. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022). Transport. Chapter 10 of the Working Group III contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report. “Battery-electric vehicles have lower life cycle greenhouse gas emissions than internal combustion engine vehicles when charged with low carbon electricity (high confidence)”; electrification “tends to play the key role in land-based transport.”
  134. Hydro-Québec. (2026). Hydro-Québec présente à la Régie de l'énergie sa reddition de comptes sur ses activités de distribution en 2025 (2025 distribution activities report to the Régie de l’énergie). 306 MW of peak shaving from smart appliances.
  135. Hydro-Québec. (2026). Grille des tarifs d'électricité (electricity rate schedule). In effect April 1, 2026.
  136. Hydro-Québec. ([no date]). Results history. Winter-by-winter record of peak demand shaved from residential customers.
  137. Hydro-Québec. ([no date]). Prix de l'électricité (in French). Residential Rate D: the price of both consumption blocks and the system access charge.
  138. Hydro-Québec. ([no date]). Rate Flex D. Variable-price residential rate: a discount off peak, a higher price during winter peak events.
  139. IMPACT World+. ([no date]). IMPACT World+. A globally regionalized life cycle impact assessment method, developed by CIRAIG and its partners. It provides the frame for the impact categories used here.
  140. InfluenceMap. (2024). 50 years of consistent oil and gas advocacy against renewables and electric vehicles [media briefing]. July 11, 2024. Since 1967, the American Petroleum Institute, then FuelsEurope and Fuels Industry UK, have held three arguments: the solution does not work, the consumer must choose, affordability and energy security.
  141. InfluenceMap. (2024). Automakers and climate policy advocacy: A global analysis. May 1, 2024. Fifteen automakers analyzed; fourteen lobbied against at least one pro-EV policy, Tesla the only one aligned with science, Toyota last.
  142. InfluenceMap. (2026). LobbyMap: Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association (CVMA). Dated positions: against Québec’s ZEV standard in June 2026, against the federal mandate in December 2025, for incentives and chargers; grade E+.
  143. InfluenceMap. (2026). The oil & gas industry’s capture of Canada’s energy and climate policy [briefing]. March 2026. The industry’s coordinated campaign obtained, within ten months, the withdrawal of key climate regulations, including the electric vehicle sales mandate in February 2026; Imperial Oil and the Canadian Fuels Association had opposed it since 2023.
  144. International Council on Clean Transportation. (2026). Plug-in hybrids in Europe emit five times more than officially reported. Press release of 2 June 2026, summarizing the report by Díaz, Tietge and Dornoff on the on-board meters of about 8 million new cars registered from 2021 to 2023.
  145. International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation. (2025). Oil tanker spill statistics 2025. ITOPF.
  146. Investment Recovery Association. (2026). EV battery recycling for investment recovery: The 2026 playbook for second-life, resale, and ROI. Hydrometallurgy recovers 95 % of the lithium and cobalt and 97 % of the nickel.
  147. iSeeCars. (2026). The top 25 cars that hold their value best, and the 25 worst. More than 950 000 transactions of five-year-old vehicles in the United States, from March 2025 to February 2026. Electric vehicles lose 57.2 % of their value, against 41.8 % for the fleet as a whole and 35.4 % for hybrids.
  148. iSeeCars. (2026). Tesla prices climb as the rest of the EV market falls. Since the US federal tax credit ended on September 30, 2025, used electric vehicle prices have risen 3.5 % while combustion vehicle prices fell 2.0 %.
  149. iSeeCars. (2026). Used hybrid demand up 41.8 % as non-Tesla EV prices plunge. In the first quarter of 2026, a non-Tesla electric vehicle took 60.1 days to sell, against 32.4 days for a Tesla, 54.1 for a combustion vehicle and 54.4 for a hybrid.
  150. IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute. (2019). New report on climate impact of electric car batteries (Report No. C444).
  151. Jessiman, B., Egyed, M., Rouleau, M., Donohue, M., Blagden, P., & Lamy, S. (2018). Les impacts sanitaires de la pollution de l'air au Canada : une estimation des décès prématurés (The health impacts of air pollution in Canada: an estimate of premature deaths). Bulletin d'information en santé environnementale, Institut national de santé publique du Québec, 23 February 2018. About 14 400 premature deaths a year in Canada attributable to air pollution from human sources.
  152. Jing, L., El-Houjeiri, H. M., Monfort, J.-C., Brandt, A. R., Masnadi, M. S., Gordon, D., & Bergerson, J. A. (2020). Carbon intensity of global crude oil refining. Nature Climate Change, 10(6), 526–532.
  153. Journal de Montréal. (2026). Un répit de 17 milliards pour les pollueurs : les Québécois paient encore (in French).
  154. Journal de Québec. (2018). Martin, S. L’auto coûte 51 G$ par année au Québec (Cars cost $51 billion a year in Quebec; in French). January 31, 2018. Presents the Trajectoire Québec and David Suzuki Foundation study: $51 billion a year, external costs included, and the equivalent of more than $20 000 per family.
  155. Kibblewhite, M. G. (2018). Contamination of agricultural soil by urban and peri-urban highways: An overlooked priority? Environmental Pollution, 242, 1331–1336.
  156. L'actualité. (2024). Posséder une voiture coûterait en moyenne 1 310 $ par mois à Montréal (Owning a car reportedly costs an average of $1 310 a month in Montreal).
  157. La Nouvelle Union. (2025). Véhicule à essence ou électrique : Éric Duhaime insiste sur la liberté de choisir (Gasoline or electric: Éric Duhaime insists on freedom of choice; in French). July 24, 2025. The leader of the Parti conservateur du Québec calls the 60% (2028), 85% (2030) and 100% (2035) targets “utopian and dangerous” and asks for the end of the quotas.
  158. La Presse. (2025). Une autonomie d'hiver pour mieux informer les acheteurs de véhicules électriques (A winter range figure to better inform electric vehicle buyers).
  159. La Presse. (2024). Publicités automobiles : Équiterre veut appliquer « la même recette » que le tabagisme (Car advertising: Équiterre wants to apply "the same recipe" as tobacco). Équiterre recommends that Quebec and Ottawa adopt a Canadian automotive advertising code making disclosure of environmental effects and safety risks mandatory, on the model of tobacco regulation, and calls for a full ban on gasoline vehicle advertising by 2030.
  160. La Presse. (2026). Comment payer moins pour se déplacer (in French).
  161. La Presse. (2026). Vailles, F. Quotas sur les véhicules électriques : appauvrir les citoyens, soulager l'industrie [Column, in French].
  162. La Presse Canadienne. (2026). Intérêt renouvelé des Canadiens pour les véhicules électriques, selon un sondage (Renewed Canadian interest in electric vehicles, survey finds; in French). Le Devoir, April 14, 2026. AutoHebdo survey of 1 761 people: purchase intent at 44% in Québec against 36% in 2025, fuel savings cited by 89%, the environment by 55%, 59% unable to buy without an incentive, 53% open to a Chinese brand.
  163. La Voix de l’Est. (2026). Une pause d'un an qui pourrait coûter cher (A one-year pause that could prove costly). Chapter V of the construction code, transition period pushed to October 17, 2027.
  164. Lai, X., Yuan, M., Tang, X., Zheng, Y., & Ouyang, M. (2022). Life cycle assessment of lithium-ion battery production in China. Journal of Cleaner Production, 378, Article 134589.
  165. Le Devoir. (2026). 1 318 rencontres entre l'industrie fossile et le gouvernement fédéral en un an (1 318 meetings between the fossil fuel industry and the federal government in one year).
  166. Le Devoir. (2026). Ottawa s'apprête à abroger l'obligation de vente de véhicules électriques (in French). The federal mandate required electric vehicles to make up 20 % of sales for the year and 100 % by 2035; the stricter emissions standard announced in its place is not yet out for consultation.
  167. Le Réveilleur. (2026). Garder sa vieille voiture thermique, plus écolo… vraiment ? (Keeping your old combustion car: greener, really?) [Video]. YouTube. Source page (in French).
  168. Levasseur, A., Mercier-Blais, S., Prairie, Y. T., Tremblay, A., & Turpin, C. (2021). Improving the accuracy of electricity carbon footprint: Estimation of hydroelectric reservoir greenhouse gas emissions. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 136, 110433. This is where the 34.5 g CO₂eq/kWh figure comes from: it estimates hydroelectric reservoir emissions and combines them with ecoinvent data for electricity distributed in Quebec in 2017.
  169. Lei, T., Chen, X., Ma, S., Jing, L., & Guan, D. (2025). A global inventory of methane emissions from abandoned oil and gas wells and possible mitigation pathways. National Science Review, 12(7), nwaf184. An inventory of 4.5 million abandoned wells in 127 countries; 90 % of leaks come from unplugged wells. The IEA, for its part, uses about 3.5 Mt of methane a year, which illustrates the uncertainty that remains.
  170. Liu, M. et al. (2026). Real-world life-cycle assessment of industrial-scale lithium-ion-battery hydrometallurgical recycling. Environmental Science & Technology, 60(8), 6203–6214. Operating data from 46 Chinese recycling plants, about half of global capacity in 2023: hydrometallurgy recovering precursors and cathodes directly cuts up to 61 % of emissions compared with the mining route.
  171. Lockwood, M. (2018). Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: exploring the linkages. Environmental Politics, 27(4), 712-732.
  172. Machala, M. et al. (2025). Life cycle comparison of industrial-scale lithium-ion battery recycling and mining supply chains. Nature Communications, 16, 988. An industrial-scale comparison of the recycling route with the mining route: recycling wins on greenhouse gases, on water and on manufacturing energy.
  173. Masnadi, M. S., El-Houjeiri, H. M., Schunack, D., Li, Y., Englander, J. G., Badahdah, A., Monfort, J.-C., Anderson, J. E., Wallington, T. J., Bergerson, J. A., Gordon, D., Koomey, J., Przesmitzki, S., Aalund, S., & Brandt, A. R. (2018). Global carbon intensity of crude oil production. Science, 361(6405), 851–853.
  174. Meng, K. C., & Rode, A. (2019). The social cost of lobbying on climate policy. Nature Climate Change, 9(6), 472–476.
  175. Milovanoff, A., Posen, I. D., & MacLean, H. L. (2020). Electrification of light-duty vehicle fleet alone will not meet mitigation targets. Nature Climate Change, 10(12), 1102–1107. Closing the gap with a 2 °C-compatible trajectory would take more than 350 million electric vehicles on United States roads by 2050, 90 % of the fleet and half of national electricity demand: electrification alone does not get there.
  176. Ministry of the Environment, the Fight against Climate Change, Wildlife and Parks (Quebec). ([n.d.]). Répertoire des terrains contaminés (Register of contaminated sites). Compilation of the contaminated-site files brought to the ministry's attention, remediated or not; makes no claim to completeness.
  177. Ministry of the Environment, the Fight against Climate Change, Wildlife and Parks (Quebec). (2026). Analyse d'impact réglementaire de l'allègement de la norme véhicules zéro émission (VZE) [PDF, in French]. June 2026.

    The cost of the weakening. The analysis puts the total net cost of weakening the standard at $17.0 billion through 2035: $2.7 billion in savings for service stations, wholesalers and refineries, $10.3 billion in net costs for consumers and $9.4 billion in social costs from greenhouse gases and air pollutants. The electric fleet expected in 2030 drops from 2 million to 1.2 million vehicles, and 7.2 billion additional litres of fuel are sold through 2035.

    The reference vehicle. Section 4.3 of the analysis sets out the general assumptions: a light vehicle driving about 16 500 km a year over an average life of 12 years, or 198 000 km, and average consumption of 7.5 L/100 km for cars and 9.2 L/100 km for light trucks running on gasoline.
  178. Ministry of the Environment, the Fight against Climate Change, Wildlife and Parks (Quebec). (2026). Liste des entreprises qui offrent des incitatifs et avantages s'appuyant sur le Règlement sur les combustibles propres [PDF, in French]. Updated October 5, 2026. Ten companies on that date, among them Grizzl-E, SWTCH, ChargeLab, TechnoVE and Roulez électrique. The ministry does not guarantee that the list is complete.
  179. Ministry of the Environment, the Fight against Climate Change, Wildlife and Parks (Quebec). ([no date]). Norme véhicules zéro émission (VZE) (in French). Credit targets imposed on manufacturers, model year by model year, and how they are computed. Targets revised in June 2026: 30 % in 2027, 51 % in 2030 and 80 % in 2035, instead of 45 %, 85 % and 100 %.
  180. Miotti, M., & Trancik, J. E. (2026). Determinants of electric vehicle emissions savings and costs across locations and individuals. Environmental Research Letters, 21(9), Article 094021.
  181. Misdariis, N., & Pardo, L.-F. (2017). The sound of silence of electric vehicles – Issues and answers. InterNoise 2017, Hong Kong. At low speed, the gap with a combustion-engine vehicle can exceed 10 dB(A); above 20 to 30 km/h, rolling noise dominates.
  182. Mitchell International. (2026). Plugged-In: EV collision insights, second quarter 2026
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  184. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2022). Oil in the sea IV: Inputs, fates, and effects. The National Academies Press.
  185. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. ([n.d.]). Gulf Spill Restoration. Site of the natural resource damage assessment trustees for the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill.
  186. Natural Resources Canada. (2026). Fuel consumption ratings [Open dataset].
  187. Natural Resources Canada. ([n.d.]). Zero-Emission Vehicle Awareness Initiative: test drives and charging education. The program targets “low confidence and awareness” among Canadians about charging and EV ownership.
  188. Natural Resources Canada. ([n.d.]). Zero-Emission Vehicle Charging in MURBs and Garage-Orphans. Drawing on work by Pollution Probe and the Delphi Group: at least a third of Canadians live in a multi-unit residential building or a dwelling with no driveway or garage.
  189. Nong, Y., Patouillard, L., Majeau-Bettez, G., & Ciari, F. (2025). Material efficiency for transport decarbonization: a case study of carsharing in Montreal. Transportation Research Part D, 149, 105037. Life cycle assessment built on the odometers of 8 639 vehicles retired in Québec, SAAQ data from 2011 to 2022, and on Communauto's operations in Montreal. Below 5 000 km a year, and at constant travel demand, switching to car sharing removes up to 89% of the life cycle emissions of an electric vehicle and 63% of those of a gasoline one; the study isolates that single mechanism, manufacturing amortised over more kilometres, with no modal shift and no rebound effect.
  190. Norges Automobil-Forbund, & Motor. (2026). El Prix winter test 2026. Twenty-four models tested down to −32 °C; average loss of 38% against WLTP.
  191. NOW Toronto. (2025). Poilievre promises to end EV sales mandates, keep battery plant subsidies. April 25, 2025. “I have nothing against electric cars. If you want one, buy one. Free choice”; battery-plant agreements would be honoured.
  192. Nyberg, D., Wright, C., Bowden, V., & Fleming, P. (2026). Carbon populism and representative politics: on why fossil fuel firms speaking for ‘the people’ is a bad idea. Journal of Management Studies. A study of the Australian case: fossil fuel firms take on a representation of the people normally reserved for elected governments, which legitimises their political activity, authorises the policies that serve them, and shapes national identity and recognised expertise.
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  194. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.
  195. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2020). Non-exhaust particulate emissions from road transport: An ignored environmental policy challenge. OECD Publishing. A light electric emits 11 to 13 % less PM2.5 than a comparable combustion vehicle, a heavy electric 3 to 8 % more; PM10 falls by 5 to 19 % in every case.
  196. P3 group, & Aviloo. (2024). Battery aging in practice. More than 7 000 vehicles from every manufacturer, some beyond 300 000 km: about 95 % of capacity at 30 000 km, 90 % at 100 000 km, then a plateau around 87 % between 200 000 and 300 000 km.
  197. Pamidimukkala, A., Kermanshachi, S., Rosenberger, J. M., & Hladik, G. (2024). Barriers and motivators to the adoption of electric vehicles: A global review. Green Energy and Intelligent Transportation, 3(2), 100153. A review of 103 studies, not a meta-analysis.
  198. Pedinotti-Castelle, M., Pineau, P.-O., & Amor, B. (2026). Réduire l'usage de la voiture : une initiative réduisant les GES et faisant croître l'économie (Reducing car use: an initiative that cuts GHGs and grows the economy; in French). Le Climatoscope, 8, September 24, 2026. Plain-language summary of the next entry: driving 20 % less in Quebec cuts emissions and grows the economy, by 0.21 % of GDP in 2030 and 0.19 % in 2050.
  199. Pedinotti-Castelle, M., Pineau, P.-O., Vaillancourt, K., & Amor, B. (2026). Capturing the economic and environmental potentials of a behavioral disruption in transportation. Sustainability Science and Technology, 3(1), 014005. Couples a model of Quebec's energy system with a general equilibrium model of its economy. The GHG gain shrinks as the fleet electrifies, the reduction then falling mostly on electricity.
  200. Peiseler, L., Bauer, C., & Gebhardt, P. (2024). Carbon footprint distributions of lithium-ion batteries and their materials. Nature Communications, 15, Article 9812.
  201. Pineau, P.-O. (2025). Électrification des transports : attention, danger ! (Transport electrification: beware; in French). Revue Gestion, HEC Montréal, January 6, 2025. Three pitfalls, minerals, the cost of subsidies, congestion; reduce and shift before improving.
  202. Planète Énergies. (2026). Maritime transport of oil and gas: Routes, ships, and climate issues. TotalEnergies outreach site, updated 2 September 2026. More than 12 000 tankers in 2025; oil freight accounts for about 30 % of world maritime trade volume.
  203. Plötz, P. et al. (2022). Real-world usage of plug-in hybrid vehicles in Europe: A 2022 update on fuel consumption, electric driving, and CO2 emissions. International Council on Clean Transportation. About 9 000 plug-in hybrids: 45 to 49 % of kilometres driven electric for private cars, 11 to 15 % for company fleets, against the 70 to 85 % type approval assumes.
  204. United Nations Environment Programme. (2020). Guidelines for social life cycle assessment of products and organisations 2020. The full guidelines download directly; the UNEP document repository returns a protection interstitial and cannot be checked by machine. Forty methodological sheets across six stakeholder categories, including the "society" category.
  205. Quantifying the degradation cost of frequent fast charging across multiple electric vehicle battery chemistries. (2025). Journal of Power Sources. Cells cycled for up to 16 months under five regimes mixing slow and fast charging, passively cooled. In the harshest scenario, no pack replacement on LFP, against three on NMC and twenty on NCA.
  206. Radio-Canada. (2024). Y a-t-il assez de bornes de recharge au Québec ? More than 9 600 public chargers across some 4 200 sites, 5 600 of them on the Circuit électrique; 9 734 workplace chargers as of 31 March 2024; more than 3.2 million Quebecers live in a multi-unit building.
  207. Radio-Canada. (2024). La puissance d'Hydro-Québec menacée par le poids des véhicules électriques (Hydro-Québec's capacity threatened by the weight of electric vehicles; in French). Of the 9 000 MW of additional capacity planned by 2035, 2 922 MW would be attributable to vehicle charging alone.
  208. Radio-Canada. (2024). Grand froid : le jour où Hydro-Québec a atteint sa pointe de frayeur (Deep cold: the day Hydro-Québec hit its peak of fear; in French). On 3 February 2023 demand peaked at 43 124 MW; internal documents show substations called on up to 45 % beyond forecast.
  209. Radio-Canada. (2024). La demande des véhicules électriques dépasse les prévisions d'Hydro-Québec (Electric vehicle demand exceeds Hydro-Québec’s forecasts). Table filed with the Régie de l’énergie: 2 922 MW called for by charging in 2035.
  210. Radio-Canada. (2025). Quebec suspends the Roulez vert program as of February 1, 2025. The provincial rebate fell from $7 000 to $4 000 on January 1, 2025, then the program was suspended until March 31 for lack of funds. Vehicles registered during that window got nothing at all.
  211. Radio-Canada. (2025). Les proprios de voitures électriques passent à la caisse au Québec (Electric car owners pay up in Québec). Stéphane Bordeleau, March 25, 2025, on the 2025-2026 budget. From January 1, 2027, an annual contribution of $125 for an electric vehicle and $62.50 for a plug-in hybrid, added to registration fees and indexed to inflation; $380M expected by 2029-2030. At the same time, the luxury vehicle duty threshold rises from $40 000 to $62 500 and the exemption for electric vehicles ends. Both are used in the wallet calculator.
  212. Radio-Canada. (2026). Des voitures électriques chinoises bientôt sur nos routes (Chinese electric cars soon on our roads; in French). January 16, 2026. Annual quota of 49 000 vehicles at a 6.1% tariff instead of 100%, from March 1, 2026, about 3% of the Canadian market.
  213. Radio-Canada. (2026). Québec abaisse sa cible de ventes de véhicules électriques d’ici 2035 (Québec lowers its 2035 electric vehicle sales target; in French). June 11, 2026. The Fréchette government brings the 2035 target from 100% down to 80%, those of 2027 and 2030 from 45% to 30% and from 85% to 51%, and temporarily admits non-plug-in hybrids; “we had to ease [this target] and answer consumers,” says minister Pascale Déry; automakers ask for a full suspension.
  214. Radio-Canada. ([no date]). Tableau de bord des prix de l'essence au Québec (Québec gasoline price dashboard; in French). Average prices by region and by station, recomputed hourly from the Régie de l'énergie station file.
  215. Ratehub.ca. (2026). Are electric cars more expensive to insure than gas cars?. Ten pairs of 2026 models compared in both of their drivetrains.
  216. Régie de l'énergie du Québec. (2024). État d'avancement 2024 du Plan d'approvisionnement 2023-2032 (2024 progress report on the 2023-2032 supply plan; in French). Hydro-Québec expects 1 615 MW of load shedding from business and industrial customers for the winter of 2024-2025.
  217. Régie de l'énergie du Québec. (2026). Régie essence Québec : carte des prix de l'essence et du carburant diesel (Régie essence Québec: gasoline and diesel price map; in French). Posted prices that retailers have transmitted continuously since April 1, 2026; the public station file feeds the budget section's fetch button, as a simple average of regular gasoline.
  218. Recurrent. (2024). EV range by state. Analysis of more than 18 000 electric vehicles.
  219. Recurrent. ([n.d.]). How long do electric car batteries last? About 15 000 vehicles from 2011 to 2023, recalls excluded: the replacement rate falls from 7.5 % for 2011 models to 0.3 % for those from 2022 on. Average battery size grew by 167 % between 2015 and 2024.
  220. Recurrent. (2026). Best EV for winter and cold weather range. Telematics from more than 30 000 vehicles: 78% of range kept at 0 °C, 70% at −7 °C.
  221. Recurrent. (2026). Used electric car prices and market report. The state of the used electric vehicle market and the wave of lease returns, concentrated on the 2023 and 2024 model years.
  222. RECYC-QUÉBEC. (2023). Programme québécois de gestion des pneus hors d'usage : révision du droit spécifique sur l'achat de pneus neufs (Quebec used-tire program: revision of the specific duty on new tires) [Press release, in French]. 26 June 2023. The duty rises from $3 to $4.50 per automobile tire on 1 July 2023; four tires, $18, counted in the price estimates of the gasoline model selector.
  223. RECYC-QUÉBEC. (2026). Piles et batteries : responsabilité élargie des producteurs (Batteries: extended producer responsibility). Road vehicle batteries are excluded from the regulation.
  224. Regroupement national des conseils régionaux de l'environnement du Québec. (2026). Mémoire : modification de la norme sur les véhicules électriques (Brief on the amendment of the zero-emission vehicle standard; in French). July 23, 2026. Four recommendations: quantify the effect on the climate target, keep and lock in the 100% target for 2035, remove non-plug-in hybrids, support purchases and ban gasoline vehicle advertising; “the transition cannot rest on the electrification of individual vehicles alone.”
  225. Regulation respecting road vehicle registration, CQLR c C-24.2, r. 29. Sections 2.1, 90.5, 90.12, 90.13 and 142.1. The additional duty on luxury vehicles: 1 % a year of the value above $40 000, for a vehicle 7 years old or less and of 3 000 kg or less; the value is the sale price, then at renewal the wholesale price from a guide, or failing that the previous value reduced by 7 % a year. Threshold and electric vehicle exemption in force until December 31, 2026.
  226. Rennert, K., Errickson, F., Cropper, M. L., Muller, N. Z., Pizer, W. A., Kingdon, C., & Anthoff, D. (2022). Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2. Nature, 610(7933), 687–692.
  227. Roberts, C., Geels, F. W., Lockwood, M., Newell, P., Schmitz, H., Turnheim, B., & Jordan, A. (2018). The politics of accelerating low-carbon transitions: Towards a new research agenda. Energy Research & Social Science, 44, 304-311. The politics of acceleration: coalitions, getting around incumbents.
  228. ROOLE. (2026). Budget automobile des Français, édition 2026 (The French car budget, 2026 edition). Second edition, on 2025 data. Routine maintenance: €598 a year for a combustion car, €345 for an electric, at 12 000 km a year (pp. 32-33).
  229. Roulez électrique. ([n.d.]). Le bonus-malus, une solution incontournable (The bonus-malus, an unavoidable solution). Quebec's additional registration fee targets engine displacements of 4 litres and more, from $36.75 to $161 a year. The author shows that displacement is a poor criterion and proposes basing the surcharge on fuel consumption and the emissions that follow from it.
  230. Roulez Électrique. (2026). 13 to 18 Points per kWh in Quebec: Home EV Charging Points Program. Club Roulez Électrique. In Quebec, 13 points per kWh for most chargers, including Tesla and Wallbox, 15 for FractalEV and 18 for Sigenergy, one point being worth one cent; rates vary by province, charger and history, and are revised every year; yearly conversion; the club is by invitation. The company sells chargers.
  231. Roulez électrique. (2026). Norme VZE : les groupes de mobilité électrique dénoncent l’affaiblissement des cibles québécoises (ZEV standard: electric mobility groups denounce the weakening of Québec’s targets; in French). August 27, 2026. AVÉQ, Équiterre and Electric Mobility Canada on the 2026 revision; counting non-plug-in hybrids has no equivalent in any standard worldwide.
  232. Roulez électrique. (2026). Nouveau Code de construction : les bornes de recharge deviennent obligatoires au Québec. Chapter V, Electricity, in force 26 March 2026: level 2 infrastructure at every space in new buildings of five units or more. Existing buildings are not subject to it.
  233. Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of Innovations. 5th edition, Free Press. The five perceived attributes that govern an innovation’s rate of adoption, chapter 6.
  234. RPM. (2023). Baisse de prix pour tous les modèles Tesla. In January 2023 Tesla cut its Canadian prices overnight: the Model Y, previously sold for up to $85 000, now started at $69 990, the largest cut in the range. In French.
  235. Ryghaug, M., & Skjølsvold, T. M. (2023). How policies and actor strategies affect electric vehicle diffusion and wider sustainability transitions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120(47), e2207888119.
  236. S&P Global. ([no date]). Canadian oil sands GHG intensity continues 17-year decline. Tracking the greenhouse gas intensity of Canadian oil sands production.
  237. Service-public.fr (France). ([no date]). Publicités incitant à des pratiques ayant un impact excessif sur l'environnement (in French). Obligations and prohibitions applying to motor vehicle advertising.
  238. Service-public.fr (France). (2026). Location sociale de voitures électriques (Social leasing of electric cars, in French). Terms of the 2026 social leasing scheme: taxable income of at most €16 880 per share, a commute of more than 10 km or 8 000 km a year for work, rent of at most €200 a month excluding insurance and options, no down payment, a contract of at least three years.
  239. Shaikh, F. (2020). Analysis of Canadian vehicle scrappage programs. International Council on Clean Transportation.
  240. Société d’habitation du Québec. (2026). Recharge des véhicules électriques (Electric vehicle charging; in French). Technical information sheet for housing partners, updated May 25, 2026. A 120 V outlet gives back “at least fifty or so kilometres of range” a night. The sheet recommends existing outlets, above all block heater outlets, to be powered at all times since a timer or the outdoor temperature sometimes controls them, and ideally on a dedicated circuit.
  241. Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec. (2026). Statistiques de la Société de 1978 à 2024 [PDF, in French]. Companion volume to the 2024 annual management report: 5 085 603 passenger vehicles registered in Quebec.
  242. Srikantharajah, S., Baillie, C., Zahnbrecher, B., & Wache, W. (2012). Evaluation of a low rare earth resid FCC catalyst. PTQ, March 2012, carried by Digital Refining. Lanthanum and cerium are the two rare earths in cracking catalysts; their price jumped in 2010 and 2011 with Chinese export quotas.
  243. Statistics Canada. ([survey discontinued]). Canadian Vehicle Survey. The last reliable source of annual mileage per vehicle in Quebec; its discontinuation after 2009 leaves FAQ 6 without an up-to-date measurement.
  244. Statistics Canada. (2026). Consumer Price Index, monthly, not seasonally adjusted. Table 18-10-0004-01. For Quebec, the all-items index goes from an average of 124.7 in 2015 to 165.2 over the first eight months of 2026, a factor of 1.32: it carries into 2026 dollars the Trajectoire Québec amounts, expressed in 2015 dollars.
  245. Statistique Québec. (2025). Véhicules en circulation (Vehicles on the road; in French). Fleet registered with the SAAQ as of 31 December each year.
  246. Steg, L. (2005). Car use: lust and must. Instrumental, symbolic and affective motives for car use [PDF]. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 39(2-3), 147-162. Two Dutch surveys, of 185 licence holders and 113 commuters: among commuters, car use rests mainly on symbolic and affective motives, not on instrumental ones. The symbolic function, after Dittmar, is twofold: expressing who one is and displaying one’s social position; car advertising appeals to power, social status and self-esteem.
  247. Stockholm Environment Institute. (2026). Oil-price shocks as a transport crisis: a turning point for fossil dependence. Analyses oil shocks as a transport crisis, and the role of electrification in dampening volatility.
  248. Tebbe, S. (2025). Peer Effects in Electric Car Adoption: Evidence from Sweden. University of Melbourne.
  249. Tesla. ([n.d.]). Model 3 owner's manual: maintenance service intervals. Battery coolant “does not need to be replaced for the life of your vehicle under most circumstances”. The reason the wallet calculator does not take up the coolant change Argonne schedules every 125 000 miles.
  250. Thatcham Research. (2026). Electric vehicle blueprint. A 10.7% fall in repair cost as workshops gain experience.
  251. The Atmospheric Fund. (2023). Climate and health organizations welcome new federal electric vehicle standards. December 18, 2023. Eight organizations, among them the Canadian Lung Association, the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment, Asthma Canada and the Canadian Public Health Association; up to 11 000 premature deaths avoided and more than $90 billion in health benefits over 25 years according to the federal analysis.
  252. The Conversation. (2023). Electric vehicle fires are very rare. The risk for petrol and diesel vehicles is at least 20 times higher. Dia, H., Swinburne University of Technology.
  253. The Charge Port. (2026). Best EV resale value 2026: 80 EVs ranked. Retention model by model on the US market. The Tesla Model 3 keeps 51.1 % of its value after four years (2022 model year, US$46 990 list price), 62.4 % after three years (2023, $42 490) and 66.2 % after two years (2024, $38 990). A commercial aggregator monetized through affiliate links, compiling CarEdge, iSeeCars, Recurrent and KBB, with a single model year per age point.
  254. The Narwhal. (2021). Electric vehicles in Ontario: a look at Doug Ford’s love-hate relationship. December 15, 2021. Rebate of up to $14 000 cancelled in 2018, public chargers removed, electric vehicle sales down by more than half in 2019.
  255. Tortarolo, D. (2026). Tax cuts and the 2026 oil shock: Can they deliver? World Bank, 4 May 2026. Fuel tax cuts are fast but blunt: they benefit richer households disproportionately, since they consume more energy, and can prove difficult to unwind once introduced. The author recommends moving support from the commodity to the person, through targeted cash transfers.
  256. Trajectoire Québec, & David Suzuki Foundation. (2017). Évolution des coûts du système de transport par automobile au Québec [PDF, in French]. April 2018 version. Costs for 1995, 2005 and 2015 in constant 2015 dollars. In 2015, households and the three levels of government spend $43.5 billion, or $5 271 per person, and external costs, taken from Transport Canada, add $7.6 billion. Total direct spending rose 33 % in twenty years, 16 % per person. Public transit, freight and parking are excluded.
  257. TranSensus LCA. (2025). Towards a European-wide harmonised, transport specific LCA approach. A Horizon Europe project coordinated by the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, from January 2023 to June 2025, bringing industry and research together to settle a common life-cycle assessment method for zero-emission road vehicles, across environmental, economic and social dimensions.
  258. Transport & Environment. (2022). UPDATE: T&E's analysis of electric car lifecycle CO₂ emissions. An update of the organization's life-cycle model for cars sold in Europe in 2022 and 2030, adding conventional and plug-in hybrids. A medium-sized conventional hybrid emits 21 % less than its gasoline equivalent, a plug-in hybrid 26 %, on a European grid at 261 g CO₂e/kWh.
  259. Transport & Environment. (2026). Plug-in hybrids emit six times, on average, what official tests claim - new EU data. 7 September 2026. On-board meters tracked by the European Environment Agency, 220 000 plug-in hybrids registered in 2024: 145 g of CO₂ per km on the road against 24 g in tests, and 169 g for a conventional gasoline car.
  260. Transport Canada. (2024). Zero-emission vehicle availability [PDF]. Report by Dunsky Energy + Climate Advisors, submitted March 2024, published November 2024. Survey of 4 240 dealerships: in February 2024, 47% had no zero-emission vehicle in stock, the smallest share since 2018.
  261. Transport Canada. (2026). Electric Vehicle Affordability Program. The new federal program, in force since February 16, 2026 and running to March 31, 2031 or until funds run out, thirteen months after the previous one closed.
  262. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. ([n.d.]). Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U): U.S. city average, all items. Series CUUR0000SA0, not seasonally adjusted: 255.657 on average for 2019, 331.655 on average from January to August 2026, a factor of 1.2973. It brings Argonne's maintenance costs, given in 2019 dollars, to 2026 dollars.
  263. U.S. Department of Energy. (2016). The “eGallon”: How much does it cost to drive an EV the same distance you could go on one gallon of gas? [PDF]. Method updated in January 2016: eGallon ($/gal) = fuel economy of comparable cars (mi/gal) × electricity consumption of the best-selling electric vehicles (kWh/mi) × residential electricity price ($/kWh). “Comparable” means the size classes in which electric vehicles are offered. The comparison applies it per litre, to the pair compared when both are in the same class, otherwise to the reference gasoline vehicle of the electric vehicle's class.
  264. U.S. Department of Energy, & Argonne National Laboratory. (2024). Impact of cold ambient temperatures and extreme conditions on BEV performance. Cabin heating draws 1.8 to 3.7 kW depending on the technology.
  265. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2026). Releases from underground storage tanks. Page updated 10 April 2026. More than 581 000 confirmed releases as of September 2025, nearly 528 000 sites cleaned up, about 54 000 still to clean up.
  266. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2026). The EPA automotive trends report. The detailed model-year 2024 file gives, version by version, the vehicle class, the inertia weight used for certification and the production volume. Averages weighted by those volumes, curb weight obtained by removing the 300 lb added to the inertia weight: car 1 520 kg, SUV 1 915 kg, pickup 2 263 kg, minivan 2 044 kg. The SUV comes out within 1 % of the 1 935 kg the ICCT publishes for 2019 from the same source.
  267. Variablegrid. (2026). Variablegrid Plus. Program of the maker of the RS40 and RS48 chargers, also sold at Kia: $0.10 per kWh, the same rate everywhere, as of August 2026. Payout on request once the balance reaches $50, with no expiry.
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  269. WattsApp. (2026). Frequently Asked Questions. Program for Tesla Gen 3 and Universal Wall Connectors, charging being measured by the charger. 100 points are worth $1; withdrawal from 10 000 points, once the credits are verified in the first quarter of the following year, by Interac e-Transfer. Page written by a script.
  270. WattsApp. (2026). Reward Rates. Historical and projected rates, in points per kWh: 21 to 33 in October 2026, temporary bonuses, an option and a draw included, against 3 points without bonuses at the start of 2026.
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